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"Is there a point at which pharmaceutical laws favor research
too much, at the expense of the affordability that comes from
price competition? How should a proper balance be struck?
Is a premium in earnings over what other sectors earn
necessary to spur research in the pharmaceutical sector? If so,
how big should that premium be? Does increasing the
premium through further intellectual property protection
always lead to more and better research?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses two approaches of conceptualizing and thinking
about how best to address the problem of access to and affordability of
drugs to low-end consumers facing life threatening illnesses such as AIDS.
The first of these approaches explores TRIPS-consistent 2 possibilities of
balancing between the interests ofthe producers ofpharmaceuticals on the
one hand, and the interests of low-end consumers of pharmaceuticals
facing life-threatening diseases on the other. In this first approach, I
proceed from an internal inquiry into the possibilities that the TRIPS
regime offers both to consumers and producers of intellectual property.

1. Edward HoreA ComparisonofUnitedStatesandCanadianLawsas TheyAffe ctGeneric
PharmaceuticalMarketEntry, 55 FooD & DRUG L.J. 373, 388 (2000)
2. TRIPS stands for "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." Jerome H.
Reichman, FromFree Ridersto FairFollowers:Global CompetitionUnderthe TRIPSAgreement,
29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 12 (1996-97). The TRIPS Agreement "established a basic
framework for balancing legal incentives to create against the public interest in free competition."
Id.
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The major claim made here is that TRIPS is based on a private property
model that exhibits two logics in tension with each other. The first ofthese
logics is that of property as a market commodity. The second is a public
policy perspective that proceeds from the view that there are circumstances
under which property can be legitimately encumbered with public
regulation consistent with TRIPS; for instance, to strike a balance between
the interests of producers and consumers of items subject to intellectual
property rights (IPR). My claim is that the commodity logic of IPR
protection simultaneously and dialectically co-exists ,ith an alternative
logic of IPR protection that recognizes as legitimate the accommodation
of public policy concerns falling within the purview of the TRIPS
agreement. Within this approach, I also examine the scope of discretion
that developing countries have in defining standards of patent eligibility,
non-obviousness and novelty, thereby leading to the emergence of state
practice consistent with certain public policy goals such as facilitating the
availability of essential medicines for low-end consumers.3
The second approach is an external approach to conceptualizing how
best to ensure expeditious access to affordable AIDS drugs. Its basic thesis
is that the problems of low-end pharmaceutical consumers facing lifethreatening illnesses are related to the FDA's regulatory framework
pertaining to the pharmaceutical industry. The FDA's regulatory
framework for pre-marketing testing and approval is driven by the need to
protect the public by eliminating, or minimizing to the greatest extent
possible, drug-related risks. This regulatory framework, which was built
largely in response to perverse notions of risk, results in the setting of high
barriers for entry into the pharmaceutical industry for small and new
companies, as well as for drugs approved in other countries. The effect of
the exclusionary impact of this framework is the monopolization of the
pharmaceutical industry. My proposed approach thus advocates a
consumer-driven, anti-cartelist strategy to end pharmaceutical industry
concentration as a strategy for addressing affordability and accessibility of
pharmaceutical products for low-end consumers facing life-threatening
illnesses. My second major claim therefore is that the FDA's regulatory
framework is a form of governmental intervention that constitutes an anticompetitive mechanism.
This second approach is driven by the'desire to foster competition in
the pharmaceutical industry as the best way of ensuring affordable and
accessible pharmaceutical products. This second approach is a good
balance, given the property rights-directed commitments of TRIPS. Unlike
the property-directed TRIPS, a competition-driven pharmaceutical
3. See id at 16; see also Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS-NaturalRights and a Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 461-69 (1996) (discussing strategies to
mitigate the initial economic costs of TRIPS).
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industry would ensure a fair return to owners of IPRs, thereby balancing
the interests of producers of pharmaceuticals with IPR protection on the
one hand and consumers of these pharmaceutical products on the other.
Here, I regard full and free competition as the most legitimate pricing
mechanism.
In short, my argument is that an increase in intellectual property
protection, such as that provided by TRIPS, necessarily involves a
reduction in competition.4 The increase in intellectual property protection
provided by TRIPS implies that the framers ofthat agreement thought that
a monopoly period of twenty years for pharmaceuticals would provide the
optimal level of incentive to induce innovation and enhance consumer
welfare.5 However, it is arguable that increasing intellectual property
protection has not eliminated piracy or even enhanced consumer welfare,
and that a competition-driven policy would complement intellectual
property protection by enhancing consumer welfare and addressing issues
related to piracy and patent infringements. 6 Indeed, as I argue in this
Article, violations of competition policy might ameliorate the shortfalls of
intellectual property protection. For example, competition can increase
consumer welfare by lowering production costs and passing the benefits
of technological innovation on to consumers.
Another major innovation in this Article is that it does not argue that
antitrust law and trade laws only operate at odds with each other. It is not
necessarily the case that antitrust law only protects consumers and trade
laws only protect domestic industry from the effects of unfair foreign

4. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV.
1815, 1816 (1984).
5. See generallyAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Masrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OFTHEURUGUAYROUND vol. 31,33 I.L.M. 81(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
6. Indeed, the Supreme Court was evenly split on this very point in K-Mart Corp.v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). At issue, in that case, was an interpretation of trademark law by the
Customs Department to the effect that United States trademark owners could not bar the
importation of genuinely marked goods made by foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 285. The Justices were
split as to whether a Customs Service regulation designed by the Treasury Department should be
based on strong intellectual property protection or on a competition-based policy that would allow
gray market imports. Id.at 291. The holding of the case is confined to instances in which American
corporations consent to the use of trademarks by importers. See id at 293-95. Four Justices
(Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia) favored apolicy based on strong intellectual property
protection, which would give trademark holders monopoly power over intrabrand competition. See
id at 286-95. Four other Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and White), favored a competitionbased policy that would allow gray-market imports to compete with locally manufactured goods
bearing the same trademarks. See id at 287-88, 295-317 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Hence, there was a split between those Justices who believed that intellectual
property protection would best enhance technological innovation and consumer welfare and those
who supported the view that competition would best enhance consumer welfare. See id at 291.
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trade.' Rather, antitrust law and trade laws complement each other in
promoting the interests ofindustry and consumers.'For example, in Pfizer,
Inc. v. India,9 the Supreme Court was invited to decide whether it could
treat a sovereign nation in the same manner as it did United States citizens
and states under the Sherman Act.'0 The governments of India, Iran, and
the Philippines, among others, sought damages against Pfizer, alleging
price fixing, market division and fraud upon the United States Patent
Office involving abroad-spectrum antibiotics."' Pfizer brought the case in
order to challenge an order of the Federal Trade Commission requiring it
and American Cyanamid to grant applicants from India, Iran and the
Philippines licenses under patents held by Pfizer and Cyanamid for broad
spectrum antibiotics. 2
The Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws of the United States
provide no alternative remedies for foreign nations, as they do for United
States citizens and states. 3 As such, a foreign nation can sue for treble
damages where it can show that it, like a domestic state, has been injured
in its business or property by antitrust violations.14 Therefore, nations can
use antitrust laws to seek remedies for unfair trade practices in the same
way that they can under trade laws."
The Pfizer case is also very relevant with regard to how the Court
reflected upon the use of antitrust laws in foreign commerce. In his
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, found that statutory language, legislative history

7. See ChristopherM. Barbuto, Note, TowardConvergence ofAntitrustand TradeLaw:An
InternationalTradeAnalogue to Robinson-Patman,62 FORDHAML. REv. 2047,2051-52,2089-94

(1994).
8. Id. at2051.

9. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
10. Id. at 309.
11. Id. at 309-10.
12. Id. at 310 n.2.

13. Id. at 318.
14. Id.
15. See Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition and Intellectual Property-TRIPS and its
Antitrust Counterparts,29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 482 (1996) (arguing that the need to

ensure competition-based law does not undermine the obligations ofTRIPS); Hans Ullrich, TRIPS:
Adequate Protectio, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, in ANTriRUST: A NEw
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 153, 193-95 (John 0. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995)

(analyzing the relationship between trade and competition policy under TRIPS); Robert D.
Anderson, The Interface Between CompetitionPolicyand IntellectualPropertyin the Context of
the International Trading System, I . INT'L ECON. L. 655, 655-60 (1998) (exploring the

relationship between competition policy and intellectual property rights); Spencer Weber Waller,
The InternationalizationofAntitrustEnforcement, 771B.U. L.REv. 343,349-60 (1997) (discussing
the failure of international harmonization efforts and the success of regional efforts).
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and Supreme Court precedents denied foreign states standing to sue under
the Sherman Act. In Chief Justice Burger's view:
[I]t takes little imagination to realize the dramatic and very
real differences in terms of coercive economic power and
political interests which distinguish our own States from
foreign sovereigns. The international price fixing, boycotts,
and other current anticompetitive practices undertaken by
some Middle Eastern nations are illustrative of the weapons
in the arsenals of foreign nations which no domestic State
could ever employ. Nor do our domestic States, in any
meaningful sense, have the conflicting economic interests or
antagonistic ideologies which characterize and enliven the
relations among nation states. 6
However, as Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted:
While the Chief Justice's dissent says that there are "weapons
[such as cartels or boycotts] in the arsenals of foreign
nations" sufficient to enable them to counter anticompetitive
conduct,... such... political remed[ies are] hardly available
to a foreign nation faced with monopolistic control of the
supply of
7 medicines needed for the health and safety of its
people.'
Indeed, this is the issue in this Article: how best to use the legal options
available to countries and communities who face the monopolization of
their supply of medicines, not only for the health and safety of their people
in general, but specifically for low-end consumers facing life-threatening
illnesses.
In Part II, I demonstrate that AIDS drugs offer new hope for AIDS
patients and that the experience of industrialized nations can be extended
to low-end consumers who are in large measure found in sub-Saharan
Africa. In Part III, I show that the place of social policy, such as in the
provision of AIDS drugs to low-end consumers, faces an built-in problem
of international economic governance. This built-in problem is a
public/private split that is biased against the inclusion of public policy
goals that are inconsistent with free trade/IPR protection in the
GATT/WTO framework. In Part IV, I explore the tension between
commodity and public policy-oriented perspectives of TRIPS. This tension
is part of the ambiguous legacy of social policy in international economic
governance that can be exploited in favor of facilitating access to AIDS

16. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 327-28 (Burger, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 318.
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drugs for low-end consumers. In Part V, I examine the variety of barriers

to entry of new firms into the pharmaceutical industry as well as to access
to affordable AIDS drugs.
II. HIV/AIDS DRUGS COCKTAILS OFFER NEW HOPE
"AIDS, an acronym for acquired immune deficiency syndrome, is an
impairment of the body's ability to fight disease. It leaves the affected
individual vulnerable
to illnesses that a healthy immune system might
'
overcome."'
AIDS patients suffer from weakened immune systems that make them
susceptible to opportunistic infections caused by fungi (yeasts), viruses,
bacteria, and protozoans. Other symptoms of AIDS include unusual
pneumonia caused by the protozoan Pneumosystis Carinii, or arare cancer
of the skin known as Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS). AIDS is contracted through
blood, breast milk, semen and vaginal/cervical secretions.
The leading cause of death in Sub-Saharan Africa today is AIDS. In
southern African countries, the infection rate is as high as 20% of the
population. In 1999, for example, Botswana had an infection rate of
35.80%, Swaziland 25.25%, Zimbabwe 25.06%, Lesotho 23.57%, and
South Africa 19.94%.9 By 1999, at least fifteen million Africans had died
of AIDS and another twenty-five million in sub-Saharan Africa were
living with the disease. 20 Four million sub-Saharan Africans were newly

infected in

1999.21

AIDS, contrary to the view that it is a death warrant, is a treatable
disease. In the United States, for example, drug treatment has quadrupled
the median survival time for Americans diagnosed with AIDS from one to
four years.' This stunning achievement is the result of a combination of
initiatives that has galvanized public attention in treating AIDS for about
twenty years. Intense public pressure on the government and the
pharmaceutical industry by AIDS activists, including the efforts of nongovernmental organizations working with AIDS patients, has led to greater
availability and accessibility of AIDS drugs, health services and support
services for AIDS patients.
Among these initiatives is the availability of a complex combination of
drugs known as a cocktail. A cocktail includes protease inhibitors and
18. AIDS FACTS AND IsSUES 4 (Victor Gang & Norman Rudnick eds., 1986).
19. JOINTUNTEDNATIONSPROGRAMMEONHIVAIDS,REPRTONTHEGLOBALHIVAIDS
EPIDEMIC 124 (2000) [hereinafter UNAIDS REPORT].
20. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Steps Up Fight Against AIDS in Africa (Sept.
14,2000).
21. UNAIDS REPORT, supranote 19, at 8.
22. U.S. Study Finds AIDS Patients Surviving Longer (Mar. 14, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/03/14/aids.survival.reutindex.html.
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reverse transcriptase inhibitors. These drugs interrupt the cycle of H[V
infection, allow an infected person's immune system to rebuild itself, and
allow theperson to live much longer than the person would without
treatment.23 In the United States, a strict cocktail regimen costs on average
between $10,000 and $15,000 per year." These regimens have reduced
mortality rates by a phenomenal 75% in the United States.' AZT
(Zidovudine) has been shown to reduce mother-to-child transmission by
up to 70% when administered to the mother during pregnancy or to the
child immediately after birth.26 By contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa and for
low-end consumers in general, AIDS has become history's worst
pandemic in part because the cocktails that have been used successfully in
the United States are too expensive.27 In addition, the provision of health
services has been undermined substantially by reallocation of funds to
other sectors of the economy.2 ' It seems, therefore, that unless measures
are taken to provide affordable drugs to the millions with AIDS in Africa,
'
they may be "already... beyond hope."29
In Brazil, the government has produced at least five generic AIDS
drugs that have been available to its citizens for free since 1997. Brazil's
policy of universal access toAIDS drugs has led to dramatic reductions in
the rate of AIDS deaths and the incidence of opportunistic infections.
While the death rate between 1996 and 1999 fell by about half, the rate of
incidence of opportunistic infections fell by 60-80%.3o The Brazilian
government invested over US $339 million in 1999 and over U.S. $462
million in 2000 into the project.31 In January 2001, the United States

23. Lawrence 0. Gustin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Name Debate": The Casefor National
H1VReporting in the UnitedStates, 61 ALB. L. REv. 679, 700 (1998).
24. Linda C. Fentiman, AIDS as a Chronic illness: A CautionaryTale for the End ofthe
Twentieth Century, 61 ALB. L. REv. 989, 1004 (1998).
25. Bernard Hirschel & PatrickFrancioli,ProgressandProblemsin theFightAgainstAIDS,
338 NEwENG. J. MED. 906,906-08(1998).
26. Eileen M. Mckcnna, Note, The Mandatory TestingofNewbornsforHI: Too Much, Too
Little, Too Late, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 307, 330-31 (1997).
27. Remarkably, the reform programs (reduced public spending and introduction of fees) of
the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) in the health sector have exacerbated
the pandemic, putting an enormous strain on public health delivery. Marc Epprecht, Investing in
Amnesia, or Fantasyand Forgetfulnessin the World Bank's Approach to HealthcareReform in
Sub-SaharanAfrica, 31 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 337, 337-56 (1997).
28. MEREDErTHTURSHENPRIVATIZINGHEFALTHSERVICSsINAFRICA 114-16(1999).
29. Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death: As Millions Perished in
Pandemic,FirmsDebatedAccess to Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,2000, at Al.
30. UNAIDS REPORT, supranote 19, at 101.
31. Id. at 102; see also Stephen Buckley, Brazil Becomes Model in Fight Against AIDS,
WASH. POST, Sept 17,2000, at A22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss4/3

8

Gathii: Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Co
AFFORDABLEAIDSDRUGS TO LOW-END CONSUMERS

requested that the WTO establish a panel to determine the legality of
Brazil's compulsory licensing laws.32
As the experience of the United States and Brazil demonstrates, AIDS
is a treatable disease, and levels of infection can drop dramatically with
increased availability of drugs: the same should be so in Sub-Saharan
Africa. While the AIDS problem in Africa is part of a bigger picture of a
health sector in crisis,33 that is no reason not to take action to facilitate
access to affordable AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. There can be no
gainsaying that low income levels in sub-Saharan Africa make costs of
over $10,000 per year prohibitive. Yet, the pharmaceutical industry has
quietly argued that selling AIDS drugs at discounts in sub-Saharan Africa
portends doom with respect to the ability to finance further research and
development. In effect, it argues that the AIDS crisis in Africa is
intractable because providing AIDS drugs, which still enjoy patent
protection in Western markets, conflicts with its commercial objectives.34
The handouts that pharmaceutical companies have announced are
laudable, but the existence of such handouts does not address the question
of affordability in the long term. In addition, it is possible that these ad hoc
responses and the infrequency with which AIDS drugs are consumed in
Africa may contribute to the creation of drug-resistant strains of the
virus.35

However, addressing the needs of low-end consumers is not a problem
specific to sub-Saharan Africa. Low-end consumers, or consumers with
little or no income, who have HIV, are found in all countries of the world.
Thus, while most of these consumers are in sub-Saharan Africa, the
problem is an international one, not merely a regional one. In this Article,
I join with others in moving from the premise that, since AIDS is treatable,
we should vigilantly seek all possible solutions to resolve this problem of
unequal access to AIDS drugs between low and high-income HIV patients.
I do so in two ways. First, I reframe the TRIPS agreement not only as
embodying the intellectual property rights protection of pharmaceutical
corporations, but also as incorporating two logics of private property that
are in tension with each other: a commodity logic that largely favors
industry and a public-oriented logic that legitimizes departures from the

32. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Untied States, WTO Doc. No.
WTDS199/3 9 (01-0093) (2001), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil
/Req4EstabPanel.html.
33. The pharmaceutical industry, in particular, makes this argument to blunt criticism that
the high cost of drugs is one of the reasons for the spread of the AIDS pandemic. See
INTERNATiONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTTUvT, PATIENT PROTECrioN AND AccEss TO
HIV/AIDS PHARMACEunrICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 53-54 (2000).

34. Gellman, supra note 29, at Al.

35. See Fentiman, supra note 24, at 1006-07.
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commodity logic in order to address certain public health concerns such
as AIDS. Second, I argue that a competition-based pharmaceutical
industry, freed from the barriers to entry put in place by the FDA, would
lower drug prices and facilitate their access to low-end consumers.
One normative initiative that complements my proposals for
conceptualizing and implementing strategies that facilitate low-end
consumers access to affordable AIDS drugs is the emerging international
right to health. Although there has not been much attention paid to norm
creation in this area,36 there have been significant developments that have
already laid a rights framework to facilitate access to essential medicines
to consumers alongside other health-related needs." States have at least
three obligations here: to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health.
The duty to respect obligates states not to discriminate in the provision of
health care, as well as to remove obstacles and barriers to access.38 The
duty to protect requires the maintenance of policies "conducive to health
protection such as effective regulation to preserve or restore clean air and
water, reduce exposure to toxic substances, and assure work place
' Finally, the duty to fulfil obliges governments to have a national
safety."39
health plan with specific targets that aim at progressively realizing a right
to basic health care.4"
However, social rights such as the right to health have not received as
high a premium as civil and political rights, especially in the present
international context of development, where social goodies are thought to
flow from the inexorable forward march of the market." Indeed, economic
reform programs under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions42 and
bilateral donors have only led to lower budgetary allocations for social
spending in areas such as health care.43 It is in this context that initiatives

36. See Virginia Leary, The Right to Health in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 1 HEALTH
&HUM. RTS. 24,26 (1994).
37. For an excellent review, see PAUL HUNT, RECLAIMING SOCIAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATiVE PERSPETVS 107-51 (1996).
38. AUDREY R.CHAPMAN, EXPLORING A HUMAN RGHTS APPROACH TO HEALTH CARE
REFORM 28 (1993).
39. Id.

40. Id. at 51.
41. Cass Sunstein, Against PositiveRights: Why Social and EconomicRights Don't Belong
in the New Constitutions,2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35,35-38 (1993).

42. The Bretton Woods institutions are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). They are named for the Brettan Woods Conference of July 1944, at which they were
conceived. Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals:PublicParticipationin InternationalEconomic
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1321 n.1 (2000).
43. Epprecht, supranote 27, at 337-56. See generallyJames Thuo Gathii, GoodGovernance
as a Counterinsurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in
InternationalLaw,5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 107 (1999) [hereinafter GoodGovernance];James
Thuo Gathii, RepresentationsofAfrica in GoodGovernanceDiscourse:Policingand Containing
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by national governments to address the AIDS crisis and the handouts of
AIDS drugs by pharmaceutical companies must be understood.
In addition, delivery of AIDS drugs is also an issue of international
trade following the adoption of the TRIPS agreement after the Uruguay
Round in 1994. Given that AIDS, like human rights and environmental
issues, is a social claim within the context of the WTO, below I explore
how social claims have stacked up against trade concerns in the
approximately fifty-year history of the international trading framework.
Ill. THE PLACE OF SOCIAL POLICY IN POST-SECOND WORLD WAR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Social issues have not been well-received by international economic
governance structures since the Second World War. TRIPS continues this

tradition. In this part of the Article, I examine the history of the social
policy's place in the post-Second World War international institutional
compromise. In so doing, I demonstrate that the difficulties of construing

or framing TRIPS as raising public health issues are deeply embedded in
the internal logic of international economic governance.
A. HistoricalContext

In the post-Second World War institutional compromise, the place of
social policy in the context of international economic institutions has been
ambiguous. There is the classical or traditional view, and there is a modern
view. In the context of IPRs, the commodity view neatly fits into the
classical or traditional view, while the public policy conception of IPRs
fits into the modern view of the place of social policy in international
economic governance.
Under the classical view, international economic institutions, such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, identify
themselves as private as opposed to public institutions. In this universe of
international institutions formed following the Second World War, the
United Nations is thought of as the public counterpart of the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and now the WTO. The public mandate
of the United Nations is to secure international peace and security. The
mandates of the IMF and the World Bank are economic as opposed to
political." The United Nations' role was designated as political because
the nature of its role is to avoid war and maintain international security.
This post-Second World War settlement between public and private
international institutions was not accidental. Rather, it was the result of a

Dissidenceto Neo-Liberalism, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STuD. 65 (1999).
44. See Good Governance,supranote 43, at 149.
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conscious design of the architects who wanted to safeguard the
international economy from the whims of politicians. In the view of these
architects, politicians had endangered the international economy in the
period following the First World War by interfering with exchange rates
and imposing high tariff barriers. Hence, it was necessary to impose
restrictions on political influence over the international economy by
placing power into the hands of technocrats.45
This dichotomy between public and private mandates is embodied in
the Articles ofAgreement of both the World Bank and IME. The Articles
of Agreement of the World Bank, for example, provide that "[t]he Bank
and its officers shall not interfere in the politicalaffairs ofany member;
nor shallthey be influenced in their decisionsby thepoliticalcharacterof
the member or members concerned Only economic considerationsshall
be relevant to their decisions,and these considerationsshall be weighed
impartially.... "46 The IMF's Articles ofAgreement have been interpreted
as providing a similar prohibition of engagement in the political affairs of
its members.47
There is precedent in the history of the World Bank's operations
suggesting that it will not comply with decisions of UN bodies on
questions of international human rights involving peace and security. In
this precedent, the World Bank declined to follow General Assembly and
Security Council Resolutions calling for the suspension of lending to
South Africa and Portugal in 1969."s The resolution was prompted by
Portugal's continuation of its colonial policy in Africa and South Africa's
continuation of its apartheid policies, both of which were determined to
constitute threats to international peace and security by the United
Nations." The World Bank adopted this position notwithstanding the fact
that its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations provided for the
Bank to have due regard to Security Council resolutions. °
45. For an excellent review of this school of thought, see generally Nathaniel Berman,
Economic Consequences,NationalistPassions:Keynes, Crisis,Culture andPolicy, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 619 (1995).

1

46. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, § 10, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 158 (1947) (emphasis added). Article H, section 5(b)
provides that"[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used
only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerationsof
economy and efficiency and without regardto political or other non-economic influences or
considerations."Id. art. III, § 5(b) (emphasis added).
47. Joseph Gold, PoliticalConsiderationsAreProhibitedbyArticles
ofAgreement When the
Fund ConsidersRequestsfor Use ofResources, IMF SURVEY, May 23, 1983, at 146-48.
48. Samuel A. Bleicher, UN v. IPRD: A Dilemma ofFunctionalism,24 INT'L ORG. 31, 31
(1970).
49. Id.
50. Under Article I, section 2 of that agreement: "By reason of the nature of its international

responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is, and is required to function
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Consequently, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the position adopted
by the World Bank's senior management on the role of the World Bank in
relation to the International Bill of Human Rights"' faced serious scrutiny
from critics ofthe development projects the Bank supported.5 2 Simply put,
this position held that the World Bank's Articles of Agreement did not
provide sufficient institutional elasticity to accommodate a larger role and
responsibility for claims such as human rights. Under this view, social
policy in the context of internationally-protected guarantees of human
rights was outside the World Bank's financial and economic mandate. The
view of the World Bank's role in human rights during that period is
analogous to the position that the WTO is isolated from the rest of public
international law today.
At the World Bank General Counsel's office, the objectives of the
International Bill of Rights were seen as contradictory to the Bank's
financial and economic mandate under its Articles of Agreement.53 This
position adopted by the General Counsel's Office is the traditional or
classical position. However, the continued tenability of the position that
the Bank's mandate is insufficiently flexible to accommodate what are
represented as political and social objectives outside the scope of its
mandate has faced innumerable and sustained challenges. The Bank has
since redescribed or modernized its mandate in response to various
challenges and responses to this classical position.
The redescription of the Bank's mandate that occurred in the 1990s can
be described as follows. The World Bank General Counsel's Office,
departing from previous interpretations, acknowledged that the Bank's
economic and financial mandate accommodates elements of the

as, an independent international organization." Agreement between the United Nations and the
International Bank forReconstruction and Development, Nov. 15,1947, art. I, § 2,16 U.N.T.S. 346
(1948). However, Article VI, section 1provides that
[t]he Bank takes note of the obligation assumed, under paragraph 2 of Article 48
of the United Nations Charter, to carry out the decisions of the security council
through their action in the appropriate specialized agencies of which they are
members, and will, in the conduct of its activities, have due regardfor decisions
of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.
Id. art. VI, § I (emphasis added).
51. The International Bill of Human Rights is the core instrument of human rights law,
comprised ofthe Universal Declaration off-uman Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Allyn L.
Taylor, Globalizationand Biotechnology: UNESCO and the InternationalStrategy to Advance
Human Rights andPublic Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479,502 (1999).
52. See Good Governance,supra note 43, at 137.
53. Ibrahim Shihata, The WorldBankandHumanRights:AnAnalysis oftheLegalIssues and
the Record ofAchievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. &PoL'Y 39, 39 (1988).
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International Bill of Human Rights. The Bank's good governance policy,
which combines economic and political conditionality, was the avenue
through which elements of the International Bill of Human Rights became
a part of the Bank's mandate. Under this reinterpretation of its mandate,
the Bank took the view that it can take into account "pervasive violations
of [human] rights to the extent that they have obvious and significant
effects on the economy of the country it assists."54 This view can be
summarized as follows: human rights goals cannot be achieved at the cost
of the World Bank's economic and financial mandate.55
This reconstruction ofthe Bank's mandate to incorporate human rights
is, in my view, not a story of progress and evolution from the classical to
the modem position.56 Instead, it is my view that both the Bank's Articles
of Agreement and the International Bill of Human Rights provide a
sufficiently open-ended interpretive arena for the continued redefinition
of the role of the Bank with respect to human rights. This possibility of
ambiguity in interpreting and reinterpreting the Bank's Articles of
Agreement and the International Bill of Human Rights simultaneously
empowers and disempowers those involved in this interpretive and
strategic work as each side constructs its case.57 Hence, the Bank's
classical position co-exists alongside positions held both within and
without the Bank that are substantially dissimilar.
Consequently, human rights activists who support a larger role for the
Bank in the protection of human rights have their goals constantly
redefined by reference to the Bank's invocation of its classical position. It
is this strategic engagement of fights work that has a disempowering effect
on human rights activism, as rights claims have to be redefined or
reconciled by finding complementarity and compatibility with the
economic policies of the World Bank. Consequently, human rights
activists, who have sought to use human rights as a means of demanding
that the World Bank adopt an approach to development that is more
humane, are constantly disappointed by the continued redefinition of their
rights claims with countervailing rights claims, all mediated through

54. Ibrahim Shihata, DemocracyandDevelopment, 46 INT'L &COWP.L.Q. 635,640 (1997).
55. GoodGovernance, supra note 43, at 107.

56. Indeed, as Roberto Unger, noted: "We have no stake in finding apreestablished harmony
between moral compulsions and institutional constraints. We know, moreover, that the received
views of institutional propriety count for little except as arguments to use against those who depart
too far from professional consensus." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 19 (1983).
57. See generally, Amr Shalakany, Arbitrationandthe Third World:A PleaforReassessing
Bias Underthe Specter ofNeoliberalism,41 HARv. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000) (arguing that legal norms
used in determining arbitration disputes are open-ended and therefore could be used for or against

third world/first world positions).
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reference to the background assumptions of the classical interpretation of

the Bank's mandate."
B. An Ambiguous Legacy on Social Issues Shapes Up at the WTO: A
Built-in Problem
The place of social issues at the WTO, in my view, reflects the same
ambiguity that characterizes the World Bank's mandate relative to human
rights. At the WTO, there are, of course, the classicists, who are selfdefined as consitutionalists. In the view of the consitutionalists, the WTO
is a self-contained institution separate from public international law and
therefore from social claims such as labor rights.59 This view is given
credibility by the fact that GATT, unlike the Articles of Agreement of the
International Bank ofReconstruction and Development, which established
the World Bank, has been widely regarded as a contract rather than a
treaty."° Then there is a countervailing view, which argues that the WTO's
mandate
cannot be understood outside the context of public international
law.61
These two opposing views of the WTO's mandate are unsurprising,
given that other international economic institutions, such as the World
Bank, already face the same legacy of ambiguity in accommodating social
policy as part of their self-described economic and financial mandates.62

58. For a good summary of this argument, see James Thuo Gathii, HumanRights, the World
Bank andthe WashingtonConsensus: 1949-1999, inAMERICAN SOCiErYOF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PROCEEDiNGS OF THE 94TH ATNuAL MEEING 144 (2000).
59. See generallyJeffrey L. Dunoff, The Deathofthe Trade Regime, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 733

(1999) (arguing that, given the institutional constraints facing the WTO panels and the contested
nature of issues falling outside the scope of the WTO, these social claims should be excluded from
the WTO because they risk delegitimizing WTO procedures); Jeffrey L. Dunoff "Trade and":
Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political
Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 759, 763-68 (1996-97) (raising concerns about the trade
regimes expansion into new substantive areas).
60. See David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1994)

(summarizing this view of GATT as a vision ofa"decentralized scheme of interstate bargaining");
Donald M. McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of
InternationalLaw, in RECuEiL DES COURS: COLLECrED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 178 (1996) (describing the view that GAIT was a contract and not a
treaty, and that "[u]nlike other international organizations which surrounded themselves with
lawyers, lawyers were notably absent from GATT, indeed often were not welcome, and the role
of law in dealing with the economic relations of States was controversial").
61. See generally David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavriodis, The WTO LegalSystem: Sources
of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398 (1998). Similarly, Donald McRae has argued that "it is clear that
at least with the advent of the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism, international law is central
to the interpretation of international trade law." McRae, supranote 60, at 176-77.
62. See James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizingthe Social in the Constitutionalizationofthe
WTO: A PreliminaryAnalysis, WIDENER L. SYMP. J. (forthcoming 2001).
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It is unsurprising for two reasons. First, the WTO has adopted a legal and
institutional architecture that, like the Bretton Woods institutions,
bifurcates its private mandate from its public mandate. Its mandate as a
private international economic institution in lowering barriers to trade can
only be limited in exceptional instances, which are defined in part under
Article XX of GATT.63 This bifurcation between privat6 and public roles
and the restrictions on departures from what was conceived as a private
mandate are the outcome of the post-Second World War institutional
compromise separating international governance into separate realmspublic and private. Yet, this post-Second World War institutional
compromise, which is nothing but an accidental constellation of ad hoc
responses to events leading to the Second World War, continues to
influence international economic governance today. It is therefore
plausible to argue that the ambiguous legacy of social issues in the context
of international economic institutions is not inevitable, but rather the
outcome of the conscious construction of its architects confined within a
legal framework that predetermines such an outcome.
One of the primary ways in which GATT has been defined as having
a limited social agenda is through the restrictive interpretations of the
exceptions listed in Article XX." Article XX potentially allows the
balancing of social objectives, such as public health and protection of the
environment on the one hand, and free trade on the other. However, that
balance has been illusory. For example, in the Tuna Dolphin Case65 the
issue was whether the United States could extend its environmental policy
of dolphin protection extra-territorially by banning imports of tuna that
had been harvested in violation of vague limits on dolphin intake.' The
United States justified its import ban on the basis of Article XX(b), which
provides for protection of animal life as a basis for departure from a

63. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 4 T.I.A.S. 669,55
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter GATT].
64. Article XX provides that nothing in the GATT
shall be construed to preventthe adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures ... necessary to protect public morals... necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health; ... relating to the products of prison
labour; ... relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;... or ... essential to the acquisition or distribution
of products in general or local short supply.

Id.
65. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1993).
66. Id. 5.1.
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country's commitment under GATT.67 In finding against the United States,
the panel noted that "[t]he United States... had not demonstrated that it
had exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin
protection objectives through measures consistent with the General
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements. 62
In the Thai Cigarette Case, 69 Thailand argued that its prohibition of
imported cigarettes was justified by the objective of reducing cigarette
smoking as a way of combating harmful health effects among its citizens. 0
It justified this prohibition of cigarette importation on the basis of Article
XX(b) of GATT.7" The panel found against Thailand, ruling that "a
contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GATT
provisions as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d)."' Article XX(d)
provides an exemption for measures that a party could reasonably be
expected to employ and that are not inconsistent with other GATT
provisions available to it. 3 The panel provided further limitations on
measures taken under the authority of Article XX(d), requiring that "in
cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which
entails the least degree of
74
inconsistency with other GATT provisions."
Hence, in both the Thai Cigarette Case and the Tuna DolphinCase,the
panel adopted a very restrictive reading of the exceptions under Article
XX of GATT. These rulings in effect read out of the treaty limitations on
free trade policies based on public health or related concerns that were
understood to be beyond the scope of GATT's mandate. This restrictive
interpretation requires measures to be consistent with Article XX ifno less
trade-restrictivealternative could be imagined to achieve the policy
objectives in question.7 5
67. Id.1 3.6(b).
68. Id. 5.28.
69. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation ofand Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
70. Id. 21.
71. Id.
72. Id. 74.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Similarly, in another panel report, a measure was found inconsistent with GATT under
Article XX(d). See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 345 (1990) [hereinafter Section 337]. The panel ruled "that a contracting
party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms
of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could be reasonably expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is also available to it." Id. 5.26. The panel
also found that "in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably
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Another way in which the trading regime has been defined as having
little to do with social claims is through the claim that it is a self-contained

regime, separate from the rest of public international law. This position
informs the restrictive interpretations of Article XX noted above.
However, following the Shrimp Turtle Case,76 there is hope for a new
direction in trade policy, away from the constitutionalist position.' A
central issue in the Shrimp Turtle Case was whether exhaustible resources

in Article XX(g) include endangered species.7' In answering this question,
the WTO Appellate Body (AB) abandoned the notion that the WTO is a
self-contained system.79 It did so by examining the question ofwhether an
endangered species was an exhaustible resource under Article XX(g) by
reference to international environmental law.' The AB, like the panel
below it in the Shrimp Turtle Case, found against the United States on

grounds other than whether or not an environmental policy protecting
turtles fell within the exception provided under Article XX(g). 1 The AB
ruling, in effect, allowed members to take action to protect exhaustible
natural resources in a manner that would have been found invalid under
rulings in both the Thai CigaretteCase and the Tuna Dolphin
the panel
2
Case.8
This enduring tension of the place of social claims in the international
trading regime embodied in the praxis of the GATT/WTO and in the post-

Second World War institutional compromise can also be traced to a
available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions." Id.
76. United States-Import Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12,1998,
38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle].
77. Similarly, and perhaps hopefully, the Appellate Body in the Gasoline11 decision found
that United States regulations aimed at reducing emissions of toxic and smog-causing agents from
motor vehicles fell within the provisional justification of Article XX(g). United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996,35 I.L.M. 603,626 (1996). However,
it also held that the regulations violated the introductory clauses of Article XX by constituting
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. Id.at 633-34.
78. Shrimp Turtle, supra note 76, at 153-54.
79. See generally MAKAU WA MUrUA & ROBERT HOWSF, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1999).

80. See Shrimp Turtle, supra note 76, at 154-57.
81. The United States' ban on shrimp imports from countries that were not certified as having
Turtle-safe shrimping methods was found to be inconsistent with GATT because it violated the
chapeau, or preamble, to Article XX, which prohibits measures applied in a discriminatory manner.
Id.at 165-69.
82. For recent commentary, see generally Virginia Dailey, Comment, Sustainable
Development: Reevaluatingthe Tradevs. TurtlesConflictatthe WTO, 9 J.TRANSNAT'LL. &POL'Y
331 (2000); Andres Rueda, Note, Tuna,Dolphins,Shrimp and Turtles: WhatAbout Environmental
Embargoes Under NAFTA?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REV. 647 (2000); Jackson F. Morril,
CommentA Needfor Compliance:The Shrimp Turtle CaseandtheConflictBetween the WTO and
the UnitedStates Court ofInternationalTrade, 8 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413 (2000).
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disciplinary bias in private international law. This disciplinary bias can be
traced to the definition of private international law as an arena free of
sovereign controls. This vision of a private international law order
comprised of private actors trading across borders without the constraints
of sovereignty has animated scholars as far back as Joseph Story in the
Nineteenth Century. 3 Similarly, inthe period after the Second World War,
Harold Koh has argued that "[i]ntemational trade has lived the four
decades since its curious birth as a legal stepchild, largely unembraced by
its sibling
fields of public international law [and] domestic administrative
,, 4
law. 3
International economic theorists thus believe that the trading regime is
a private order insulated from public claims or sovereign controls such as
those at issue in the Thai Cigarette Case and the Tuna Dolphin Case.
These cases are aligned with the views of economists such as Wilhelm
Ropke, who advocated a liberal economic order premised on the largest
possible 'depoliticisation' of the economic sphere. For Ropke,
depoliticising the economic sphere as such was a safeguard against
socialism.85 Other scholars in this tradition conceptualized social claims
not as a form of collectivism or socialism, as did Ropke, but as a form of
economic sovereignty that had to be restricted in favor of a rule based on
international economic law." Economic sovereignty under this view was
dismissed as an attempt by developing countries, through efforts such as
the New International Economic Order, 7 to extend the political concept
of sovereignty into economic relations, where it did not belong." Still
others claim that the trading regime is a liberal constitutional order akin to
an invisible hand under which free trade is maximized under a regime of
rule-based, minimal governments.8 9
83. See generally e.g., JOSEPHSTORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHECONFLICTSOF LAWS (1883).
84. Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets ofInternationalTrade: A Perspectiveon the
Proposed UnitedStates-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1987).
85. Wilhelm Ropke, Economic OrderandInternationalLaw, 86 RECUEIL DES COURS 203,
224, 236 (1954).

86. See, e.g., Georg Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International
Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 31 (1966).
87. TheNew International Economic Order refers to a movement in the late 1960s and early
1970s for third world sovereignty over the means and ends of development. The movement was
ultimately overshadowed by demand in the late 1970s for international principles governing
development. James C.N. Paul, The UnitedNations andthe Creationof an InternationalLaw of
Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 310-11 (1995).
88. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problemsofa New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 J.

WORLD TRADE L. 338, 343 (1982).
89. See generally, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IN THE UNrIED STATES, THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY AND SwIzTERLAND (1991).
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Clearly, then, the place of social claims in the trading framework has
taken shape within an international economic legal framework that
displaces it from the onset. This framework thus only accommodates those
assumptions consistent with this background assumption." Given that
social issues are conceptualized as falling outside the direct mandate of
international economic governance, the outcomes in the Thai Cigarette
Case and the Tuna Dolphin Case can be understood. Yet, following the
Shrimp Turtle Case,there is clearly a different approach that questions the
isolation of the trading regime from public international law norms such
as human rights and environmental protection.
The purpose of my analysis in this section has been to illustrate that the
tension regarding the place of social issues in international economic
governance generally is a built-in problem.9 It is therefore unsurprising
that the provisioning of affordable AIDS medicines to low-end consumers
faces the same challenges in the context of TRIPS as human rights claims
have faced in the context of the Bretton Woods institutions. This built-in
problem arises largely from the dichotomy of private and public
consequences in international economic governance. Public consequences,
such as providing access to affordable AIDS medicines, human rights and
environmental protection, are presumed to be controversial and
problematic given the WTO's mandate of lowering barriers to trade. The
pursuit of freer trade, by contrast, is regarded as less controversial because
it depoliticizes international commerce by eliminating sovereign controls
over it.
However, the suggestion that private policy goals such as free trade are
apolitical and uncontentious is troubling due to its artificiality. The fallacy
of this distinction is made evident by the assumption that private
international law, as opposed to public law, is apolitical because it does not
depend on sovereign controls, as if the absence of sovereign controls
constitutes neutrality. It is problematic to presuppose that politics is only
found where there are public interventions into civil society (as in
protecting human rights) but not where social claims are made (such as
provisioning of affordable medicines for AIDS patients) within a regime
of private international law-TRIPS. The restrictiveness with which

90. See David Kennedy, The DisciplinesofInternationalLawandPolicy,12 LEIDENJ. INT'L

L. 9, 12-13 (1999) (describing various approaches for identifying bias in law that purports to be
neutral and employing a methodological approach that identifies bias in the deep structure of law
in terms of its disciplinary sensibility to its own internal contradictions and background
assumptions, which preclude it from seeing some things that are not consistent with those

assumptions).
91. See id. (arguing "that a discipline's blindspots, strategies of evasion, elision, or
forgetfulness might be linked to bias of various sorts... [such as] elisions or contradictions internal
to a disciplinary sensibility with external biases").
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TRIPS is construed in the context of providing affordable medicines is not
merely the logical apolitical outcome of a private international regime, but
the outcome of a process of making choices between alternative visions of
TRIPS. Making these choices is not any less political than the forms of
economic regulation that are understood as political by WTO
constitutionalists. 9 2 This differs from the vision of private international law
as an apolitical legal arena.93
IV.

THE DIALECTICAL CHARACTER OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

UNDERTRIPS
Based on the foregoing analysis of international economic governance,
it comes as no surprise that TRIPS is based on a private property model

that exhibits two logics in tension with each other.9 The first of these

logics is that of property as market commodity. The role of property under
this logic is that of individual preference satisfaction. The underlying
rationale of property rights in the commodity conception is based on a

view of a society of free individuals engaging in maximally free contracts.
Markets operate as utility-maximizing machines, socially optimizing the
aggregate sum of satisfaction with scarce resources through mechanisms
of choice, supply, demand, and price.95 In essence, private property rights
in this system are important incentives to high productivity because people

92. Similarly, Adelle Blacket, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and
Treaty Interpretation,31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999), argues that "social clause
proponents should be thinking less about a negotiated 'clause' grafted onto the existing GATT
framework, and more about a social dimension through treaty interpretation." Id. at 5. Making a
similar point, David M. Trubek, ProtectionismandDevelopment: Time ForaNewDialogue?,25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &POL. 345 (1993), stated that"[r]ather than seeking exceptions to general rules,
the South may initiate a new dialogue on trade matters by lobbying for greater enforcement of the
basic principles and disciplines the developed countries have officially endorsed." Id. at 364. For
the same debate in the context of whether deep integration leaves room for socialjustice, see DAVID
M. TRUBEK, SOCIAL JusTICE "AFTER" GLOBALIZATION: THE CASE OF SOCIAL EUROPE 3
(MacArthur Consortium Research Series on International Peace and Cooperation No. 9, 1996).
93. See James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and InternationalGovernance:
Decenteringthe InternationalLaw ofGovernmentalLegitimacy,98 MICH. L. REV. 1996,2024-27

(2000).
94. See generally TRIPS, supranote 5.
95. According to Mark Kelman, it is just an assumption that the actual choices embodied in
contracts and markets reliably reflect what people truly value. Kelman argues that there is a wide
divergence between choice on the one hand and utility-what people actually value-on the other.
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STuDiEs 127-28 (1987). If we agree with Kelman,
the regime of free contracts cannot therefore reliably provide us the optimum of what we actually
deem valuable. There are duress and other forms of constraint that limit our choices. Choice does
not reflect value choices such as those related to equality and participatory democracy, as these
kinds of values would provide market choices and legitimacy by maximizing the similarities rather
than the differences between choice and value.
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get to keep what they produce. Without property rights, people would
there is no room
produce less because they would get to keep less. Here,
96
for political controls over individual use of property.
The second logic is a public policy perspective of property rights.
Under this second logic of property, there are circumstances under which
property can be legitimately encumbered with public regulation, for
instance to strike a balance between the interests of producers and
consumers of IPRs. This public policy alternative is embedded in the
provisions of the TRIPS agreement that contemplates a balance between
the rights of producers and consumers of IPRs. It is also implicit in the
discretion that TRIPS presupposes that countries have in implementing the
treaty. Hence, for example, there is no consensus on certain issues such as
subject matter of protection. The status of computer programs and
biotechnologies is unclear.97 In addition, the novelty and nonobviousness
standards of eligibility for patents are unclear.98 All of these unclear areas
give developing countries room to develop practices consistent with their
goals. These areas of discretion also extend to the exact scope of exclusive
rights, as it is unclear whether the doctrine of equivalents applies. 9
Similarly, there is much discretion afforded in the exceptions that TRIPS
allows; for example, it is unclear whether a country must declare a national
health emergency to invoke compulsory licensing."00
The logic of property as commodity has as a central goal the
maximization of returns on investments so that owners of IPRs can receive
returns on their investments and conduct research and development. The
rallying cry of the private sector group that conceptualized the TRIPS
agreement came on the coattails of a fair trade debate in the United States.
In the context of IPRs, the fair trade debate arose as a way of addressing
piracy of American and, in general, Western corporate IPRs in developing
and rapidly developing countries. Although fair trade was the chosen
means of the advocates of the TRIPS agreement to combat IPR piracy, the
true goal of these advocates in adopting a private property model was to
maximize profits and returns on investment for the purpose of research and
development of IPRs.
96. For critiques of this protectionist, anti-consumer, pro-industry position, see generally
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996). See generallyOddi, supranote 3.
97. See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and InternationalLaw, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47,97
(2001).
98. See Curtis M. Horton, ProtectingBiodiversityandCulturalDiversityUnderIntellectual
PropertyLaw: Toward a New InternationalSystem, 10 J. ENVYL. L. &LmG. 1,27(1995).
99. The doctrine of equivalents'means that if two devices do the same work in substantially
the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they
differ in name, form, and shape." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (6th ed. 1990).
100. Reichman, supra note 2, at 16-17,26.
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It is my claim that the commodity conception of IPRs is not the only
vision of private property embedded in the TRIPS agreement. The TRIPS
agreement was seriously debated against a background of at least two
visions in tension with each other on the role of private property in
international society. Under the commodity conception ofprivate property,
TRIPS embodies a form of IPR protection aimed at realizing the maximum
profit possible in the marketplace. Under the alternative view, TRIPS can
be conceptualized as embodying a vision that balances the returns
producers seek for their research and development and the benefits that
IPRs extend to society. Here, the focus is much broader than giving
producers of IPRs the right to realize the maximum profit possible./'
The "maximum profit possible" view of the commodity conception of
IPRs is justified on the basis that it is only reasonable and fair to

compensate owners of intellectual property for their investment in research
and development. Under this view, those who put their effort, labor, and
capital into the market should get a return or reward for their input,
without the risk of piracy. According to this commodity logic of private
property, producers have an incentive to produce only when these returns
101. In Munn v. Illinois,94 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1876), the Supreme Court held that the Illinois
state government has the power to regulate owners' returns on their businesses, which trumps
private agreements regarding price and limits investment return on private property. This power,
the Supreme Court held, arose where there was a public interest that justified such regulation of
private property. Id. at 126-27. In other words, where an industry is intertwined with a public
interest, state governments have the power to limit profit. See id The law in question in Munn was
similar to many laws passed in the Midwest at that time to regulate the warehousing and
transportation of grain. See id. at 125. Defining grain elevators as public warehouses the Illinois
statute established maximum rates for grain storage. Id. at 113-14. In Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. PublicServiceCommission, 262 U.S. 679,692-93 (1923), the Court held that
there is "no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable
industries." Hence, on the issue of protection of private property rights, the Court seems to suggest
that only a minimum rate of return is constitutionally required; protection of property rights only
has to be reasonable and fair. See Id; Munn, 94 U.S. at 129. There is an implicit protection of the
consumer, to the extent that a fair profit also entails a fair price to the consumer. See Bluefield, 262
U.S. at 692-93; Munn, 94 U.S. at 129. However, note that following the Supreme Court decision
in Chicago,Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), a doctrine shift from
Munn occurred. In that case, the Court invalidated a statute that made railroad rates that a
commission had established without a hearing conclusive injudicial proceedings to enforce them.
Such absence of an investigation, the Court held, was a deprivation of the company's lawful use
of its property. Hence, in Milwaukee, the Supreme Court departed from Munn in holding that even
businesses affected with a public interest had a due process right to check legislative power to
regulate railroads for reasonableness. Eventually, in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the
Supreme Court, in holding as unconstitutional a Nebraska statute imposing rate reductions
averaging 29.5% on intrastate shipments, completed its doctrinal shift away from Munn. Following
Smyth, a "corporation's opportunity to realize profits for private benefit, even as to firms that were
licensed to serve the public interest," was raised to a constitutional level. GREGORY ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

270(1997).
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are guaranteed. This view proceeds from a very strong view in favor ofthe
sanctity of property. This view further justifies intellectual property
protection as a necessary precondition for promoting transfers of
technology to developing countries.
The foregoing view however, understates the invariable tensions that
this commodity logic of private property generates in the context of public
policy. Hence, for example, early in the negotiations on TRIPS and
immediately after it came into force following the Uruguay Round, the
United States was greatly opposed to reading flexibility (or limitations on
IPR protection) into TRIPS. However, there has seemed to be a
recognition of the need to be flexible in implementing TRIPS in the last
two years. Hence, in May 2000 President Clinton signed an Executive
Order ordering the United States Trade Representative (USTR) not to
impose trade sanctions under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 or
revoke any intellectual property laws or policies of sub-Saharan African
countries related to promoting access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or
medical technologies to affected populations. 102 Similarly, in United States
constitutional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has stopped short of
treating rate regulation as a deprivation of property without due process."3
I therefore argue that there is no single tradition of intellectual property
protection in TRIPS. My claim is that the commodity logic of IPR
protection simultaneously and dialectically co-exists with an alternative
logic of IPR protection that recognizes as legitimate the accommodation
of public policy concerns as falling within the purview of the TRIPS
agreement. In essence, the TRIPS agreement is predicated on an implicit
balance between the interests of producers and consumers of IPRs.'"°
One of the reasons that the dialectical character of intellectual property
protection has been understated over the last several years has to do with
the success of the classical economic vision of free markets in shaping the
production of legal doctrine relating to IPRs. I claim that the production
of legal doctrine in the context of TRIPS was also heavily influenced by
discourse about markets and therefore by the commodity view of private
property rights. This free market rhetoric that has characterized debates
about free trade and globalization under the aegis ofneo-liberal economics
102. Exec. OrderNo. 13,255,65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, 30,522 (2000). This executive order also
required sub-Saharan African countries to provide adequate and effective intellectual property

protection as a precondition for increasing access to HIVIAIDS drugs. Id. at 30,521.
103. In Munn, 94 U.S. at 125, Chief Justice Waite noted that under certain circumstances,
price regulation may constitute a deprivation of property without due process. However, in the

context of pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS agreement, there is no parallel to price deregulation,
especially following the wave ofderegulation that has accompanied the wave ofglobalization since
the late 1980s. See also supranote 101.
104. For a preliminary attempt to articulate this sense of balance in the trading regime in
general, see Gathii, supranote 62.
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over the last several years has given the commodity logic of private
property rights enormous credibility while simultaneously de-legitimating
governmental limitations on private property."°5 Yet, this vision of free
markets with its attendant subscription to a model of property as
commodity is only one of the contending visions of intellectual property
that has characterized debates on the ideal international IPR regime.
Hence, while TRIPS evidences the success of those committed only to
the commodity vision of private property, this vision has been in severe
contention and tension with an alternative vision of IPRs. That alternative
vision is characterized by the assertion that public policy issues such as
human rights, environmentalism, and public health issues like AIDS have
a legitimate place in TRIPS. This tension is partly a reflection of the
significance of seeing the TRIPS regime within the context of prevailing
social, political, and economic circumstances. These circumstances in turn
influence the construction and interpretation of the legal norms of the
TRIPS regime and, as such, produce a tension with the prevalent
commodity conception of IPRs. ° Seeing TRIPS this way demonstrates
the nature of its built-in public/private dichotomy, which is most evident
when we start considering the policy options and choices it provides for
or forecloses.
In this part, I aim to clarify this tension in the construction and
interpretation of different logics ofproperty under the TRIPS regime. Only
one ofthe private property logics of TRIPS, the commodity logic, has been

105. However, as Duncan Kennedy reminds us, the role of law has been simply to transpose
from equally presumptuous economics the "idea of respect for the labor of others" by defining
private property as embodying the legal equivalent or repository of the labor of others. Duncan
Kennedy, The Role ofLaw in Economic Thought: Essays on the FetishismofCommodities,34 AM.

U.L. REV. 939, 955 (1985). Hence, "[c]lassical legal thought conceived the legal system as
designed to guarantee everyone that they could safely embody their labor in commodities and freely

exchange them. This idea was essential to the classical economists' claim that the distributive
process merely compensated economic actors for their labor inputs." Id. at 956. Further, Kennedy
notes that

[c]lassical legal thought supported the classical economists' claim that the
outcome of economic processes was 'natural' by showing that state intervention
could be organized in accord with natural law, rather than as a distorting activity.
If all rational men must agree, not only that property was sacred and pacta sunt
servanda, but that a code could be deduced from those abstractions, then state
activity in enforcing the code could hardly be described as artificial.
Id.
106. This does not in any way suggest that international legal regimes like TRIPS do not have
an autonomy of their own, independent of prevailing circumstances.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 3
FLORIDA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 53

well developed and articulated, while the contending public policyoriented perspective has not been articulated as well in the literature."0 7
The contribution my Article makes in developing a public policyoriented perspective of private property rights is guided by the principle
that private property rights have a social as well as a political character,
apart from their economic character in seeking the highest returns for
owners of private property. Private property is valued not only as an end
and right in and of itself, but also in terms of its social utility, which comes
from political demands such as those related to accessibility and
affordability of IPR protected products that will help to meet public health
needs of low-income individuals. 0 8
Indeed, it seems that Western governments, which have most
vehemently advocated a commodity logic ofintellectual property based on
maximizing profits to producers of IPRs, have in certain cases backtracked. For example, as noted above, the United States has adopted a
policy of allowing sub-Saharan African governments discretion to adopt
laws and policies facilitating access to AIDS drugs without fear of
imposition of sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."°
This, in addition to the political demands associated with dramatic
moments such as the Seattle protests,' complemented by public policy
constructions and interpretations of the TRIPS agreement, can be
characterized as constituting and indeed beginning to crystallize a public
policy-oriented conception of intellectual property rights.
Similarly, on September 17, 1999, the United States and South Africa
reached a common understanding on the relationship between.
pharmaceuticals and public health."' While both governments committed

107. Some works with aspirations in this direction include: JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SoFTwARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996);

Aoki, supranote 96; Keith Aoki, TheStakes oflntellectualPropertyLaw,in THEPOLITICSOF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 259 (David Kairys ed., 1998) [hereinafter Stakes]; Samuel Murumba,
GlobalizingIntellectualProperty:Linkage andthe Challenge ofa Justice Constituency, 19 U. PA.
J. INT'LECON.L. 435 (1998); Oddi, upranote 3; Ruth GanaOkediji, TowardanInternationalFair
Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (2000); Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright andPublic
Welfare in GlobalPerspective,7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (1999); Reichman, supra note

2.
108. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP 20 (2000), notes that property law "is highly protective of the prerogatives of owners,
but it also recognizes that ownership may impose vulnerabilities on others and limits the rights of
owners when their actions impinge on the legitimate interests of other." Id.
109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110. In November 1999, a diverse group of demonstrators gathered in Seattle to protest the
negative aspects of international trade and globalization. PeterL. Fitzgerald, Massachusetts,Burma
and the World Trade Organization:A Commentary on Blacklists, Federalism and Internet
Advocacy in the GlobalTradingEra,34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001).
111. Steven Lee Myers, South Africa and U.S. End Dispute Over Drugs,N.Y. TIMES, Sept
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themselves to the TRIPS agreement, they nevertheless acknowledged the
need to address the AIDS epidemic as a public health emergency."'
However, one must also not forget that the planned actions of the United
States with respect to Brazil and Argentina indicate a tendency the other
way.

A. The Commodity Logic of PrivatePropertyEmbodied in TRIPS:
The BackgroundforAggressive IPR Protection
The TRIPS agreement evidences the success of a coalition of private,
American high-technology firms in linking intellectual property protection
to trade and to the GATT/WTO framework. This coalition, known as the
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), was formed in the early 1990s with
two major aims. The first was to make IPR protection a central part of
United States foreign trade policy. The second was to use this new
prominence of IPR protection in the domestic foreign trade policy context
to improve international IPR protection, primarily through new
internationally-binding minimum standards that would be adopted in the
course of the Uruguay Round and enforced by the WTO. The strategy of
the thirteen member IPC," 3 under the leadership of then-Pfizer Chairman
and CEO Edmund T. Pratt, was to forge an alliance with European and
Japanese high-technology industries, as well as with the governments in
Europe, Japan and the United States. Their goal was motivated in part by
the desire to gain leverage in the creation of the GATT/WTO framework
under negotiation in Uruguay, and to achieve IPR protection.
A primary impetus behind this privately sponsored initiative was the
shift in the United States' comparative advantage with respect to products
and services with a market value that is greatly dependent on international
intellectual property protection. For example, the value of United States
exports produced with IPR protection rose from 9.9% in 1947 to 27.4% in
1986, a 17.5% percentage point increase in about four decades." 4 Given
this trend, the new locus of the United States' competitiveness now largely
depends on its capability not only to generate research, software designs,
entertainment, engineering concepts, advertising, marketing, styling, legal
and financial innovations and information-based inventions, but also to

18, 1999, at A8.
112. Seeid.
113. These thirteen members were: Pfizer, General Electric, Merck, IBM, Du Pont, Warner

Communications, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol Myers, FMC Communications, General Motors,
Johnson and Johnson, Monsanto, and Rockwell International.
114. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 4 (R.
Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988). The products measured in 1947 were

chemicals, books and electrical machinery, while in 1986 they included those items and computers.
Id.
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protect these forms of intellectual property as rights. Such protection
would in turn secure the competitive edge of United States intellectual
property exports.
However, as a central part of United States foreign trade policy, the
shift in the United States' comparative advantage from an advantage solely
in terms of industry, technology, and resources to an advantage in
transforming or producing conceptual notions into intangible flows of
ideas and money was the result of private sector lobbying. The backdrop
against which the high-technology sector in the United States raised the
need for more prominence of IPR protection in foreign trade policy was
the debate on fair trade. One of the rallying cries of the fair trade debate
characterized United States IPRs as particularly vulnerable to piracy at the
hands of developing countries. There was a particular concern regarding
countries such as Japan and those of Southeast Asia, which had achieved
dramatic levels of growth based on imitation and mimicry of the high
technology of United States corporations. The following factors fueled the
fair trade debate: the trade deficit, especially with Japan; unemployment
losses, which were somewhat directly related to declining export levels,
and lobbying especially by organized labor.' 15
This perception further held that foreign competition from Third World
countries had increasingly made it harder for the United States and
developed countries in general to maintain their standards of living, or
even their high rates of economic growth. Japanese growth was an initial
impetus of this perception in the 1980s. These perceptions congealed into
claims of unfairness that propelled United States unilateralism and
leadership in the Uruguay Round of GATT. The debate was structured
somewhat around the claim that the United States had progressively
opened its border to international trade without a concurrent reciprocity on
the part of its trading partners. One consequence the trade debates of this
era was the quest by the United States to pry open foreign markets that had
been perceived to have been closed to United States commerce." 6

115. On the complex relationship between unemployment and international trade, see JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, TRADE AND WAGES: A MALIGN RELATIONSHIP (Department of Economics, Columbia
University, Discussion Paper No. 761, 1995). Bhagwati argues that it is not entirely clear that the
low wages in developed countries can easily be accounted for solely by labor-saving technologies
and skills-biased technological changes, and that the effects of globalization in and of themselves
cannot account for the loss of these jobs. However, Dani Rodrik argues that there is a probable
relationship between the loss of labor's bargaining power in the United States and globalization
because globalization increases the substitution of labor across national boundaries much easier.
See DANm RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997).
116. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patricks eds., 1990).
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Edmund Pratt Jr., Chairman and CEO of Pfizer, was at the time of this
debate and since 1979 a member of President Carter's Advisory
Committee on Trade and Policy Negotiations (ACTPN). The mandate of
this private sector group was to review and to report to Congress on the
policies of the USTR's Office, as well as to advise the USTR on trade
policy. As the ACTPN chair from 1981, Pratt led not only the IPC but also
the ACTPN in making IPR protection a central part of United States
foreign trade policy. This turned into a remarkable conceptual and policy
success. Conceptually, the acknowledgement of IPRs as a trade issue
heralded a new era of United States trade policy, shifting from merely
advocating open markets for trade to actively prying open foreign markets
for United States goods (particularly IPRs) while simultaneously seeking
aggressive international legal protections for IPRs in these new markets.
It is noteworthy that Pratt and IBM Chairman John Opel jointly chaired the
force of the ACTPN at the time when these changes were
intellectual task
7
place.1
taking
Another policy success of the ACTPN initiative institutionally was the
formation of a new office of Assistant USTR for International Investment
and Intellectual Property in the early 1980s. Congressional action also
followed suit with significant changes made to the Trade Act of 1974. In
1984, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was amended to authorize the
USTR, without a showing of injury by the industry, to take retaliatory
action against countries falling to give adequate protection to intellectual
protection."' Section 303 was amended to authorize the USTR to report
on barriers to trade in countries throughout the world." 9 Section 501 was
amended to authorize the President to consider the adequacy of intellectual
property protection in deciding whether a developing country should be
granted tariff preferences under the United States Generalized System of

Preferences. 120
In 1988, the Trade Act of 1974 was further amended, by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, through the passage of Special

117. Some startling statistics from a variety of industries on the losses they had sustained as
a result of lax, inadequate, or non-existent IPR protection in developing countries gave further
impetus to the claims of unfairness. Among the industries that alleged piracy were pharmaceutical
as well as copyright-based industries such as the movie, publishing and software industries. In
1986, for example, the United States International Trade Commission estimated that inadequate
intellectual property protection had cost United States firms between $43 and $61 billion in 1986
alone. PFIER: GLOBAL PROTEcTiON OF INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY 9 (Harvard Business School,
Case No. 9-392-073, 1995).
118. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 301, 98 Stat 3000 (1984)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
119. See id. § 303(a), 98 Stat. at 3001-02 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001)).

120. See id. § 501, 98 Stat. at 3001-02 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465

(2001)).
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301.21 Special 301 is a unilateral trade power that requires the USTR to
identify foreign states denying intellectual property protection to United
States firms and to designate the most important of these as "Priority
Foreign Countries."'" The designation of a country under the priority list
requires the USTR to initiate an investigation within thirty days to
determine whether the foreign practices involved violated United States
rights under a trade agreement or were unreasonable or discriminatory."2
The enhancement of the USTR's jurisdiction, as well as the unilateral
jurisdiction of the United States that was apparent on the face of these
amendments, reflected a major policy shift of United States trade policy
towards retaliation rather than reciprocity in securing foreign markets for
United States goods and services.
The increased authority of the USTR in the area ofIPRs in turn laid the
stage for the United States to unilaterally single out countries opposed to
the TRIPS agreement for punitive action unless they complied with United
States law. The threat of unilateral sanction was also used to push
developing countries to support TRIPS at the Uruguay Round. The
countries placed on the Priority Watch List in 1989 in this effort included
India, Brazil, Taiwan, and Thailand, which all opposed the inclusion of
IPR protection in the Uruguay Round in general and TRIPS in particular.
The actions against Brazil and India, two of the biggest members of the
developing country coalition, a group of seventy-seven countries, played
a major role in splitting the coalition and in securing acquiescence to
TRIPS by developing countries.
In 1988, the IPC issued its "Basic Framework" document, which
embodied the outlines of the TRIPS agreement. 24 Building consensus with
European governments and corporations was problematic, especially in
view of the emerging tendency towards United States unilateralism.
European countries, for example, were inclined towards a multilateral
approach that embodied considerations such as special and differential
treatment for their former colonies. The European Union member
countries and industries wanted a Code on Intellectual Property Rights that
would eventually become a part of GATT.
The American-led IPC wanted a system of intellectual property
protection that was binding on all nations, not only those that had ratified
such a Code, as had been the practice under similar GATT codes. The
Japanese government and Japanese industry, like their European.

121. See 19 U.S.C.§ 2242(aXI)(A) (2001).
122. See id § 2242(a).
123. Id. § 2412(bX2XA).
124. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMrITEE Er AL., BASIC FRAMEWORK OF

GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-A STATEMENT OF THE VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN,
JAPANFESE, AND UNITED STATES BusINESs COMMUNmEs (1988).
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counterparts, were reluctant to proceed with the IPC's proposals. To
overcome these hurdles to an IPR agreement, the IPC used its relationship
with the United States federal trade establishment to increase bilateral
pressures through the enhanced powers under Section 301, among others.
In addition, the IPC suggested that the United States should condition debt
forgiveness to Latin American countries on adequate patent protection.
The bilateral pressures of the United States, which were based
primarily on its unilateral retaliatory powers, were critical in leveling
opposition to TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Working Group on Intellectual
Property. Whereas the IPC's basic framework did not anticipate all the
differences the United States, the European Union, and Japan haggled over
during the Uruguay Round, it undoubtedly put IPRs on the international
trade agenda. The success of industry in making IPRs a part of the
GATT/WTO framework is evident in the definition of IPRs.
The industry's success in bringing IPRs to the WTO was further
enhanced by the United States' conditional acceptance of the Uruguay
Round agreements on the acknowledgment of its unilateral power under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Consequently, the
United States has reserved the authority to enforce the Uruguay
Agreements where members of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding did not comply with their obligations at the end of the
dispute settlement process.'

TRIPS is unprecedented because it is the first international treaty to
embody a regime ofprivate rights with minimal attention to the underlying
public policy issues underlying IPR protection. Traditionally, trade and
economic treaties have created rights for private parties indirectly through
their respective public authorities. However, TRIPS departs from this
norm by providing an elaborate international private law regime with

remedies such as injunctive remedies,126 border measures against

counterfeiting' 27 and penalties for infringement.128
TRIPS is also unique in the way it has influenced and will continue to
influence distributional benefits disproportionately in favor of Western or,

125. A WTO panel has found that sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 are consistent

with United States obligations under the WTO. United States-Sections 301-310 of Trade Act of
1974, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS152/R (99-5454) (1999). At the 2000 Annual Meeting of the

American Society of International Law (ASIL), Robert Howse argued that this decision was
consistent with international legal principles allowing countries to engage in unilateral actions in
their foreign relations as set out in Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253 (Dec. 20).
However, Petros Mavriodis argued that this case raised the possibility that the panel was mistaken
to the extent that section 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is the cornerstone of the
multilateral system of dispute settlement at the WTO.
126. TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 44.
127. Id. arts. 51-60.
128. Id. art. 46.
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at the very least, large corporations with enormous resources, which have
the necessary expertise to take advantage of its provisions." 9 One of the
most significant ways in which TRIPS narrows distributional gains is by
its overwhelming reliance on a notion of original authorship. Hence,
through a conceptual shift, science, commerce, and research are reconstituted solely as information, as opposed to being appreciated for their
underlying value as scientific, commercial and educational resources, and
the knowledge that they bring. For example, TRIPS protects control over
expressions rather than ideas.13 0 Similarly, it protects the information value
contained in patents rather than inventions that have been reduced to
practice.' Trademarks have similarly expanded the scope of exclusive
control over marketplace signals in commerce, thereby departing from
their signaling function in the marketplace.'
This conceptual shift towards original authorship in turn leads to the
underprotection and underappreciation of indigenous knowledge, culture,
dances, artifacts and physical resources. 3 Hence, where indigenous
knowledge forms the basis for new pharmaceutical products, such
indigenous knowledge is uncompensated because it is regarded as merely
being raw material, which only acquires IPR value once it is transformed
by scientific intervention. This shift in terms of conceiving forms of
knowledge as information heavily favors the Western industrialized
countries in general, and owners of technologies in those countries in
particular, as they hold the industrial, technological, and resource
advantage in transforming or producing conceptual notions into intangible
flows of ideas and money.
Yet, while the significance of the medium grows, the product cost
devoted to producing the medium drop; however, that saving in cost of
production is not passed on to the consumer. Hence, as the price of
producing a diskette or even a drug drops, the price of the diskette or of
licensing the patent for it grows under the regime created by TRIPS.' 34 The
exclusivity of control of information under the TRIPS regime, contrary to
the notions of its most ardent supporters, will therefore "diminish the

129. To take one small example that has potential to weigh heavily in favor of Western

multinationals, the TRIPS agreement adopts a first-to-file as opposed to a first-to-invent system for
determining IPR protection. This seemingly insignificant change favors "large corporate research
and development departments with staffs of patent lawyers working on time consuming and
complex patent applications." Stakes, supranote 107, at 271.
130. See TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 9 § 2.
131. See id art. 27.
132. See id.arts. 15-21.
133. For an inquiry into this issue, see Ruth L. Gana Okediji, Has CreativityDiedin the Third
World? Some Implications of the InternationalizationofIntellectualProperty,24 DENv. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 109, 125-37 (1995).
134. BOYLE, supra note 107, at 7.
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availability of our cultural heritage, inhibit artistic innovation, and restrict
public debate and free speech" in a manner that will undermine innovation
and scientific progress.'35
B. The PublicPolicy-OrientedLogic ofIntellectualPropertyRights

A public policy conception stands in tension with the commodity logic
of IPRs in TRIPS. Although this public policy oriented conception ofIPRs
is overshadowed by the prevalence of the commodity conception in
commentary on TRIPS, it nevertheless co-exists with the commodity
conception. One central tension between the commodity and public policy
conceptions of IPRs is as follows: the commodity oriented impulse
towards the liberty interest of producers of IPRs to realize profits on the
one hand is in tension with the interests of consumers of IPRs in receiving
a fair price and accessibility to products subject to IPRs on the other.
According to proponents of the public policy perspective of IPRs, the
pre-TRIPS protection of international IPRs balanced the interests of
consumers and producers of IPRs. IPRs were, in the pre-TRIPS period,
understood as being intended to support public uses for information that
scientists, teachers, students, business people, librarians, and others need.
Private use was guaranteed to the extent that it fulfilled these public
purposes. TRIPS, by contrast, has created a catalogue of extensive
liabilities that compromise these public uses of intellectual property rights.
In fact, TRIPS seems to be predicated on the notion that any
uncompensated use of IPRs is subject to sanctions. TRIPS has thus upset
135. Id. at 124-25; see also WILLIAM ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INCHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995) (arguing that Chinese history
undermines the thesis that there is a historical correlation between economic development and
respect for intellectual property rights); William Alford, How Theory Does-And Does NotMatter:AmericanApproachestoIntellectualPropertyLawin EastAsia, 13 UCLAPAC. BASINLJ.
8, 16-19 (1994); Bhupinder S. Chimni, The PhilosophyofPatents: StrongRegime Unjustified,52
J. SCI. &INDUS. RES. 234,234-39 (1993) (questioning the idea that a hard notion of property rights
is necessarily consistent with higher productivity). According to Alford, intellectual property rights
cannot be implemented successfully in isolation from other rights. Hence, he suggests that concerns
about human rights are indispensable to the attainment of intellectual property protection. He bases
this view on the premise that serious copyright protection depends upon political and economic
pluralism and independentlegal institutions capable ofvigorously enforcing citizens' rights. Alford,
supra,at 18.
Even Friedrich A. von Hayek, the conservative free market commentator, has expressed
skeptical views on the relationship between large investments in research and development, which
should justify increased levels of I protection on the one hand and innovation on the other.
According to Hayek, "recurrent re-examinations of the problem [of intellectual property] have not
demonstrated that the obtainability of patents of invention actually enhances the flow of new
technical knowledge rather than leading to wasteful concentration of research on problems whose
solution in the near future can be foreseen. .. ." FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT:
THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 37 (W. W. Bartley I ed., 1988).
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that balance by overprotecting the rights of producers at the expense ofthe

interests of consumers and, indeed, even of other producers of IPRs by
constricting13an
6 arena of social and commercial space for uncompensated
"fair uses."'
Proponents of TRIPS, as noted above, claim that developing countries
are stealing the intellectual property rights of Western innovators, thereby
compromising future productivity. This, the argument goes, is critical

because America's economy presently stands on its competitive advantage
in intellectual property. However, there is clearly a countervailing view.
This countervailing view regards it as imperative to maintain a "balance"
in a country's popular, legal, and technical conceptions of intellectual
property. In the United States, this balance is founded in the Constitution's
Patent and Copyright Clause.3 7 This clause implies a balance between
intellectualproperty andan intellectualcommons and, if the balance tilts

too heavily in one direction, the public loses its constitutionally protected
right to a vigorous public domain.' Similarly, a variety of developing
countries adopted policies that excluded pharmaceutical and agricultural
products from IPR protection with a view towards maintaining their public
health and food needs through affordable medicines and food.'
In the pre-TRIPS era, international protection of IPRs was embodied
in a number of international treaties." There were two underlying
principles related to international IPR protection in the pre-TRIPS regime.
First, IPR protection was based on the principle of national treatment.
136. See Aoki, Stakes, supra note 107, at 270-71.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
138. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHMR LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). However,

courts in the United States have expanded the scope of American intellectual property rights in
ways that underminethat implicitconstitutiona balance. InDiamondv.Chakrabarty,447U.S. 303,
318 (1980), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that non-naturally occuring manufacture (or
genetically created micro-organisms or life forms) qualify as patentable subject matter. In State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. SignatureFinancialGroup, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit similarly extended the scope ofpatentable subject matter
by holding that "the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating
numbers, out putting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it
nonstatutory subject matter, unless... its operation does not produce 'a useful, concrete and
tangible result."' Id.at 1373 (quoting Inre Alappot, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In Feist
Publications,Inc. v. RuralTelephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340,360 (1991), the Supreme Court
apparently opened the door to copyrighting compilations of information if there is a degree of
creativity in the selection and compilation of the data.
139. See Vandana Shiva, Farmers' Rights and the Convention on BiologicalDiversity, in
BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107, 114-15 (Vincente
Sanchez & Calestous Juma eds., 1994).
140. See generally,e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm); Berne Convention for the
Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (as revised on July 24,
1971 in Paris).
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Under this principle, each country was bound to protect the IPRs of other
countries in a manner that was no worse than the manner in which it
protected its own. That is, every country was only obliged to protect the
IPRs of other countries as it protected its own. Second, under the principle
of national treatment each country retained its sovereignty in determining
its own level of IP protection, except in a few instances in which
international treaties included substantive protections.'
In essence, TRIPS is unprecedented. It is unprecedented because it is
the first treaty that provides a minimum international substantive regime
of IPR protection. Unlike any other WTO agreement, TRIPS also departs
from the norm of regulatory diversity. Hence, GATT, for example,
provides general principles such as most-favored-nation status (MFN) and
national treatment for determining whether countries are proceeding with
trade liberalization.' 42 Each member country then can choose how best to
meet the goals of liberalization. However, TRIPS is the first example of
an international trade treaty that aims at deep integration, as it is not
premised on achieving trade goals through regulatory diversity.
The departure of the TRIPS agreement from the principle of national
treatment, as well as from regulatory diversity, has had both procedural
and substantive consequences for IPR protection. Procedurally, TRIPS
sidestepped the role of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) as the international institution through which international
protection of IPRs was to be coordinated. The WIPO, the United States
argued, with the prodding of the IPC, had to be avoided as the institutional
home for international IPR enforcement. GATT, with the promise of the
WTO and an enhanced dispute resolution machinery, was the forum with
more promise of international IPR enforcement.
It is important to mention that the national treatment principle is indeed
preserved under the provisions of TRIPS in Article 3.143 Under Article 3,
the exceptions allowed under the pre-existing intellectual property
conventions of the WIPO are also allowed under TRIPS.44 Where these
exceptions allow material reciprocity, a consequential exception to MFN
treatment is also permitted. 45 Trips also provides for certain other limited
exceptions to the MFN obligation."
Substantively, TRIPS came to embody the interests of the IPC-led
Western coalition. A primary example of how TRIPS overprotects the
interests of Western countries, particularly those of the United States, is

141. See GATT, supranote 63, art. III, § 4.
142. See id.art. I, § 1, art.L I, § 4.
143. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 3.

144. Id.
145. See id

146. See id.
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that IPRs are defined as only those forms of knowledge that are capable of
industrial application.' 47 This definition reflects the sector in which the
United States has the largest export sales. It excludes all sectors that
produce and innovate outside the industrial mode of production. Profits
and capital accumulation through industrialization are recognized as the
only ends to which IPRs can be put. 14 In addition, IPR protection in
TRIPS is non-derogable, meaning that, unlike public international law
49
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
countries cannot make reservations to TRIPS without the consent of all
signatory state parties."s It would be difficult to get such consent.
The sovereignty that countries had in the pre-TRIPS era to determine
how far to extend IPR protection was lost. (For example, in the pre-TRIPS
era, a variety of developing countries had decided not to extend patent
protection to pharmaceuticals. The reason was to ensure the availability of
medicines to their citizens at affordable prices.) In other words, some
countries had chosen not to extend monopoly protection to certain
products in the public interest.
The post-TRIPS international environment narrowed the sovereignty
of countries bound by TRIPS to determine appropriate levels of IPR
protection. Unlike GATT, for example, TRIPS does not embody the
principle of special and differential treatment. Under this principle,
developing countries were entitled to preferential trading relationships. For
example, while developed countries trade on the basis of the norm of
reciprocity or unconditional MFN status, developing countries do not
enjoy the same level of obligations as industrialized nations. Hence, a
developing country in trading with a developed country does not have to
extend the trading privileges it extends to that developed country to all
members of GATT.
The developed country, by contrast, is obliged to extend all the
privileges it extends to its trading partners to all members of GATT. This
in essence gave developing countries a chance to participate in
international trade with countries with much higher levels of economic
achievement. In addition, the developing countries also received trading
privileges such as preferential access for their imports in the markets of
developed countries. However, as noted above, such preferential access for
developing country imports in the United States under the Generalized

147. Article 27 (1) of TRIPS provides that, "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application."
148. Shiva, supra note 139, at 110, 115-16.
149. See generally International Convention Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
150. Id.art. 72.
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System of Preferences was conditioned on developing countries signing
onto TRIPS.5 In addition, other cross-conditionalities or cross-retaliatory
measures require developing countries to protect the IPRs of the United
States without the risk of suffering retaliatory sanctions under Section 301
of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988.152
So what is left of the public policy-oriented conception of IPRs in
TRIPS? There is a prospect that the multiple extra-TRIP voluntary
arrangements entered into between developing countries and
pharmaceutical companies to provide pharmaceuticals on concessional

terms evidence a recognition by pharmaceutical corporations of the large
public policy concerns underlying international IPR protection.
Various provisions of TRIPS. embody a sense of balancing the
protection of intellectual property rights on the one hand, and the
underlying public policy objectives that the protection of intellectual
property rights requires on the other. More importantly, the inclusion of
policy objectives and the various exceptions to IPR protection reflect the
flexibility with which the commodity conception ofprivate property rights
embedded in TRIPS ought to be construed and applied.
Article 7 provides that the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute both to the promotion of technological
innovation, which is much to the advantage of developed countries, and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology to developing countries."
This sense of balance is also provided in Article 7 in its provision to the
effect that IPR protection is not an end in itself. " This article
contextualizes IPR protection, first to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge, and second to the promotion of
social and economic welfare and to the balancing of rights and
obligations.55

Article 8 recognizes the rights of members to adopt measures for public
health and other public interest reasons and to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights, provided that such measures are consistent
with the provisions ofthe TRIPS Agreement)56 Article 8, section 2 further
provides that "[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of [TRIPS], may be needed to prevent abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which

151. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.

153. See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 7.
154. See id
155. This article should be read in conjunction with the preamble, which reproduces the basic
Uruguay Round negotiating objectives established in the TRIPS area by the 1986 Punta del Este
Declaration and the 1988-89 Mid-Term Review. See id, preamble.
156. ld. art. 8.
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unreasonably15restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
7
technology."'
The WTO recently endorsed this view of balancing between the
interests of producers and consumers of intellectual property rights in its
background paper to the African Trade Ministers conference in Libreville
late last year.' 58 Hence, I claim that the exclusivity of patent protection,
especially in the pharmaceutical industry, ought to be seen in the context
of balancing the interests of the industry in recovering its investments on
the one hand, and the interests of consumers, and especially low-end
consumers suffering from life threatening illnesses, on the other.
Indeed, if TRIPS is read as an inflexible regime of exclusive IPR
protection, that would legitimize a market failure in the provision of drugs,
particularly for low-end consumers suffering from life threatening diseases
such as AIDS. That is to say, TRIPS exacerbates the lack of access to and
the lack of affordability of AIDS drugs, especially for low-end consumers,
in light of the already prevailing anti-competitive international
pharmaceutical industry.
In addition, there are a variety of other provisions in TRIPS that
contemplate a balancing of the interests of producers and users of IPRs.
Whereas these provisions are hedged with limitations requiring
consistency with protection of IPRs, they nevertheless give governments
some discretion in realizing certain public policy objectives. Article 6, for
example, makes provision for the principle of international exhaustion,
which allows parallel imports."' Article 30 permits members to provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent in instances
relating to experimental uses and noncommercial uses."6 However, such
an exception would be subject to the proviso that it must "not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and [must]
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account ofthe legitimate interests of thirdparties.' ' 6' Article 27,
section 3 (b) allows for the nonpatentability ofsubstances existing in nature
and, to an arguable extent, of animals and plants. 162 Article 13 arguably
allows for an exception to copyright protection under the fair use or private
use exception. 63 Article 31 allows compulsory licensing, although it is

157. Id. art. 8,§ 2.
158. Libreville 2000-Meeting of African Trade Ministers, WTO Doc. No. M/LIB/SYN15
(Oct. 23, 2000), available at http://www.itd.org/Libreville/docs/MMLIBSYN15.doc.
159. TRIPS, supra note 5,art. 6.
160. Id. art. 30.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. 27, § 3(b).
163. Id. art. 13. However, see Okediji, supra note 107, at 78-79.
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qualified165
by at least eight preconditions."' Article 28 provides for parallel

imports.

The coercive bargaining framework within which TRIPS was accepted
has been acknowledged as a primary reason for reading flexibility into it.
There was overwhelming pressure to have TRIPS embody the commodity
conception of IPR protection. One outcome of the dominance of Western
countries, and the United States in particular, in promoting a vision of IPR
protection heavily biased towards developed countries was that the
underlying public policy issues were significantly understated. That
explains why the foregoing provisions of TRIPS are hedged with
requirements
for consistency with what is really the commodity version of
IPRs.'66
In addition, little attention was paid to the costs of developing countries
benefiting from this new legal framework, TRIPS, without the fiscal and
institutional wherewithal to realize its benefits. In essence, TRIPS was
designed to benefit the interests of industries in developed countries,
which have the resources and experience to take advantage of this new
agreement. In addition to private businesses in developing countries
standing to lose from TRIPS, the governments of developing countries
may fare no better, as they continue to suffer high compliance costs in
implementing required policy changes.167 It is now clear, in retrospect, that
TRIPS was negotiated under circumstances that understated the
significance of public policy and the development implications of IPRs.
The Uruguay Round was too focused on trade in and of itself, as if
removing border restrictions on trade was necessary for developing
countries to solve their development problems. As J. Michael Finger
noted, the WTO is still moving in this same direction; only this time its
clarion cry seems to be that of shaping all domestic regulatory and legal
164. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31. These conditions include: (1) that authorization of the use

without the consent of the patent owner must be considered on its individual merits; (2) that efforts
to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable terms and conditions must first be made (except for
government use, which only requires notification); (3) that the scope and duration of the use must
be limited to the purpose forwhich it was authorized; (4) that the use must be nonexclusive; (5) that
the use must be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the member
authorizing the use; (6) that the authorization of use can be terminated if and when the
circumstances which led it to cease to exist are unlikely to recur, (7) that the patent owner must be
paid adequate remuneration, taking into account the economic value of the authorization and the
decisions relating to authorization; and (8) that remuneration must be subject to judicial review or
other independent review by a distinct higher authority within that member. Id.
165. Id. art. 28.
166. CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THEURUGUAYROUND AND THE
THm WORLD 69-80 (1990).

167. Under Article 67 of TRIPS, developed countries committed themselves to providing
technical and financial support to developing and least developed countries, with a view towards
assisting them in implementing TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 67.
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systems-from the institutional infrastructure ofthe economy to the export
interests of the developed world.' 6 ' There are at least five reasons for
cautious optimism for a public policy-oriented perspective having a place
on the table alongside the perspective of those who support exclusivity of
patent protection.
First, like South Africa, Thailand has also benefited from such an
understanding by the United States with regard to its compulsory licensing
laws. Writing to Thailand, the USTR's office noted:
We encourage Thai officials to explore all options for
extending access to effective treatments, including ongoing
direct dialogue with pharmaceutical manufacturers. But the
final choice is one for Thailand to make. If the Thai
government determines that issuing a compulsory license is
required to address its health care crisis, the United States
will raise no objection, provided the compulsory license is
issued in a manner fully consistent with the WTO Agreement
on Trade 69Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).1

This retreat by the United States is instructive to the extent that it provides
a role for public policy with regard to AIDS as it relates to patents.
Although unsurprisingly encumbered with a proviso that Thailand must
engage in compulsory licensing consistent with TRIPS, it represents a
departure from a prior policy that seemed impervious to policy claims in
the context of the AIDS epidemic.
In addition, the use of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193017 by the
United States in the Thailand AntiAids Drug Case, which was
subsequently invalidated by a GATT panel, provides a hopeful
precedent. 71 In that case, a Thai patent law allowing for compulsory

168. J. Michael Finger, The Uruguay Round North South Bargain: Will the WTO Ever Get
Over It?, delivered at the Conference on the Political Economy of International Trade Law in
Honor of Professor Robert E. Hudec, (Sept 15-16, 2000). Chakravarthi Raghavan, The World
Trade Organizationand its Dispute Settlement System: Tilting the Balance Against the South
(Trade and Development Series No. 9, 2000), at http'//www.twnside.org.sg/title/tilting.htm,
similarly argues that the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism is a complex and expensive
proposition for developing countries.
169. Letter from Joseph S. Papovich to Mr. Paisan Tan-Ud (Jan. 20, 2000), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/ustrletteran27.html.
170. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337,46 Stat. 590, 703 (1930) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2001)) (allowing for seizure and destruction of patent-infringing
goods).
171. Id.For a description of the facts and points of law at issue; see also RALPH H. FOLSOM
ET"AL., INTENATIoNAL Busmnss TRANSACrIONS 798-823 (1995). Note that the United States
moved to comply with the Panel's findings in Section 337 when it incorporated the Uruguay Round
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licensing of patents that had not been used in the country was at issue.'
Pfizer had only recently succeeded in pushing the TRIPS agreement
through and registering its patents on Tetracine and AntiAids in Thailand.
Thailand informed Pfizer that, because it had not established local
processing of these drugs, it would invoke compulsory licensing with a
view towards addressing a rapidly growing rate of IRV infection."l To
safeguard its interests in Thailand, Pfizer filed a complaint with the United
States International Trade Commission under Section 337 ofthe TariffAct
of 1930 requesting preliminary and permanent relief for the importation
of drugs manufactured in Thailand in contravention of Pfizer's patents. 74
Section 337 proceedings were at the time extremely attractive to United
States companies and burdensome to foreign companies because they had
relaxed standards of evidence (including hearsay) and relatively short
periods of discovery and trial (limited to seventy days), compared to a
proceeding in a federal district court."
In 1989, a GATT panel ruled that Section 337 violated the national
treatment provisions of Article M, section 4 of GATT. 6 The panel noted
that imported goods were treated less favorably than domestic goods under
Section 337, and the GATT council adopted the decision.'" Subsequently,
the United States amended Section 337 to allow counterclaims in
proceedings initiated under its authority.' While this may have been a
limited victory since there are several other arenas where the battle over
pharmaceuticals was playing out, it illustrates that there are spaces within
the present structure of GATT/WTO law for accommodating actions such
as compulsory licensing.
The second reason for hope involves the recent South African
controversy, which also relates to compulsory licensing. South Africa
passed legislation titled the South African Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, which is similar to

commitments into its domestic legislation. See U.S. Trade Policy Review Body of the WTO, Fourth
Review of the United States Trade Policies Conducted on 11 and 12 November, 1996-Press
Release/Press/T PRB/46 Oct. 31, 1996 available at http:llwww.wto.orglwto/english/tratope

/tprtp46e.hm.
172. See supra note 172.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See William A. Zeitler, Book Review, FederalUnfairCompetitionAction: Practiceand
ProcedureUnder Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930,86 AM. J. INT'L L. 238,239 (1992).
176. Section 337, supranote 75, 6.3.
177. Id.
178. Uruguay Round AgreementsActof 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465,108 Stat. 4814 (codified
as RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 18.4

(1995)).
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Thailand's law allowing compulsory licensing.'79 Soon thereafter, the
USTR put South Africa on the watch-list under super 301 of the Trade
Act, which authorizes the USTR to commence investigations with a view
towards establishing violations of United States IPRs, which would in turn
form the basis for retaliatory action. 0
After intense public protest in South Africa, around the world, and in
the United States, then-Vice President Al Gore formed a commission,
which he jointly chaired with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. On
September 17, 1999, as noted above, South Africa and the United States
reached an understanding that accommodated South Africa's concerns
relating to the AIDS crisis as well as the United States' concerns regarding
patent protection. 8' The USTR thus withdrew South Africa from the
watch list. The success of public pressure on a senior administration
official demonstrates room for administrative interventions, which may
create room, albeit in minimal ways, for advancing a public policy
oriented view of IPRs. Subsequently, the big pharmaceutical companies
withdrew a suit against the South African government for passing
legislation that is in part inconsistent with the government's commitments
under TRIPS.
The third reason for hope is an Executive Order signed by President
Clinton in 2000 ordering the USTR not to impose trade sanctions against
a sub-Saharan African country pursuing a policy or law aimed at
addressing the AIDS epidemic. 8 2 As noted above, this Executive Order
also seeks to give such countries an incentive to comply with TRIPS.
Some administration officials, such as Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, took the view that the AIDS crisis constituted a situation that
involved the national security interests ofthe United States. That view was

explored in January 2000, when Richard Holbrooke, the United States
Permanent Representative to the UN, addressed a forum convened as part
of the United Nations' focus on Africa that month.8 "
Fourth, Bristol Myers-Squib, which together with Yale University,
owns patent rights for Zerit, an AIDS drug, announced in March 2000 that

it will waive those patent rights in South Africa. In effect, Bristol-Myers
Squib and Yale University have opened the door for a drug still enjoying
a patent monopoly in countries other than South Africa for marketing as

179. See Zachie Achmat, We Can Use Compulsory Licensing andParallelImports: A South
African Case Study, at http://www.hri.calpartners/alptac/license.shtml.
180. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (2001)).
181. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
183. Gore VowsAIDSHelpforAfrica: Security CouncilAddressesCrisis,MONITOR CHRON.,
Jan 11, 2000, at A12.
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a generic."' Bristol Myers-Squib also announced that it would sell its
AIDS drugs, Videx and Zerit, to any African country for the cost of one
dollar per day per dosage, eighty five cents for Videx and fifteen cents for
Zerit' 85 The announcement by Bristol Myers-Squib came very shortly
after Merck announced that it would sell two of its AIDS drugs, Crixivan
and Stocrin, to poor countries at about one-tenth the United States price.
However, in March 2000, both Bristol Myers-Squib and Merck were
part of a five company (together with Boehringer Ingelheim, Glaxo
Welcome (now GlaxoSmithkline) and F. Hoffman La Roche) initiative
with UNAIDS that unsuccessfully sought to reduce prices of antiretrovirals by eighty-five percent. Critics of this initiative have called it a
public relations gimmick, and one hopes that these new arrangements do
not fail to come through as well." s In addition, Bristol Myers-Squib, in
late 2000, pulled out and eventually scaled back its own commitment of
a $100 million charitable initiative it dubbed "Secure The Future" to fight
AIDS in Africa. In withdrawing the commitment, Bristol-Myers was
acknowledging an internal debate on what moral obligations the company
had towards sick people who could not afford medicines and how such
obligations1 7would be reconciled with the company's commercial
objectives.
Another hopeful effort on the horizon is an offer by Cipla, an Indian
company that manufactures generics, to supply AIDS drugs to developing
countries at extremely low prices. It has announced its willingness to sell
generic versions of eight of the fifteen anti-HIV drugs, which, in varying
combinations, are used in the cocktails, at a nominal fee of $600 per year
per patient- a small fraction of the $10,000 to $15,000 that high-income
consumers pay." 8 Cipla has also made an offer to supply these drugs at
$350 per year per patient to Doctors Without Borders. Cipla hopes that its
initiative will bring down the price of AIDS drugs by breaking their
monopoly pricing.""

184. According to John L. McGoldrick, Bristol Myers' Executive Vice President, "This is not
about patents; it's about poverty and a devastating disease.... We seek no profits on AIDS drugs

in Africa and we will not let our patents be an obstacle." Karen DeYoung & Bill Brubaker, Another
Firm Cuts HIVDrugPrices,WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1.
185. Id.
186. Dagi Kimani, Why Not Take Up Offer ofCheaperAIDSDrugs?,DAILYNATION, Feb. 24,
2001; see alsoBarton Gellman,A TurningPointThatLeftMillionsBehind: DrugDiscountsBenefit
Few While ProtectingPharmaceuticalCompanies' Profits,WASH. POST, Dec. 28,2000, at A01.
187. Bill Brubaker, The Limits of $100 Million: Epidemic's Complexities Curb Impact of
Bristol-Myers'sInitiative,WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000, at Al.
188. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Africa's AIDS War,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al.
189. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in
Africa,N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 7,2001, at Al.
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Fifth, and significantly, is the discretion that developing countries have
in complying with the TRIPS agreement. At the outset, clearly Article 7
of TRIPS provides for safeguard provisions, and Article 8 provides for
public interest exceptions.'" Under these provisions, as well as under
provisions allowing compulsory and parallel licensing, developing
countries can legally depart from TRIPS in order to address public health
emergencies such as the AIDS epidemic. 9 ' Some scholars have suggested
that these countries should adopt high standards of patentability so that
only revolutionary, as opposed to merely improving, inventions are
granted patents. 19 2 Another method might be to allow prior art form to
defeat novelty. This might be very useful in cases in which developing
countries contend that a patent claim is based on pre-existing indigenous
knowledge. All of these instances would be justifiable, as there is no
consensus on an international standard of absolute novelty.' 93
Ultimately, it seems very plausible that one of the ways in which
compliance with TRIPS would best be achieved is by ensuring an
international consensus on the core values underlying it.'94 This would
imply balancing public and private uses of IPRs as well as balancing the
needs and imperatives of capital with basic needs such as affordable and
accessible foods and medicines for the world's low-end consumers. A
threat-based TRIPS agreement cannot balance these interests in a way that
guarantees its legitimacy.
C. The Dialecticsof CompetingConceptions of Propertyin TRIPS
The public policy perspective of IPRs both affirms and contradicts the
private property logic as well as the free trade goals of the WTO. It affirms
the free trade goals of the WTO because the forms of flexibility under
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are required to be consistent
with protection ofIPRs. Hence, although there are limits to IPR protection,
these limits are carefully circumscribed. The commodity conception of
IPRs leaves limited room for the underlying public policy goals embedded
in TRIPS.' 95

190. TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 7-8.
191. See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord:
Models For State Practice in Developing Countries (paper for United Nations Department

Programme, 2001), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/recommededstatepractive.html.
192. See Oddi, supranote 3, at 464-65.
193. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 30.
194. Michael W. Smith, BringingDevelopingCountries'IntellectualPropertyLawsto
TRIPs
Standards:Hurdles andPitfallsFacing Vietnam 's Efforts to Normalize an IntellectualProperty

Regime, 31 CASE W.RES. J. INT'L L. 211, 235 (1999).
195. There is some case law in the United States suggesting that courts will not protect holders
of patents against infringement when a patent has been misused. This is an exercise of equitable
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Yet, in another respect, the commodity conception of IPRs in TRIPS
contradicts the public policy goals underlying TRIPS by circumscribing
public policy goals to the narrow confines of consistency with IPR
protection. In the same respect, to the extent that the public policy
limitations of IPR protection are a part of TRIPS, they are inconsistent
with IPR protection.
In short, it is not entirely implausible to observe that recognizing the
commodity conception of IPRs, as well as the social and political character
of IPRs, would be laden with contradictions, but also have room for
complementarity. The public policy oriented vision of IPRs contradicts the
market oriented property vision of IPRs because it acknowledges that
limitations on the commodity-oriented conception are necessary and
reasonable.

V. FDA CARTELIZATION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL

INDUSTRY AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR Low-END CONSUMERS

My thesis in this part of the article is that the FDAs high standards of
drug safety and effectiveness, which are embodied in pre-marketing testing
and approval requirements, result in the cartelization ofthe pharmaceutical
industry. The FDAs cartel effect is the indirect and unintended result of a
regulatory regime for drug approval that is heavily driven by perverse
notions of risk. In addition, this regulatory regime acts as an insurance
mechanism for the pharmaceutical industry to avoid the high costs
associated with product liability for unsafe and ineffective drugs. In short,
these high standards of drug approval have the result of cartelizing the
pharmaceutical industry.
This regulatory environment exacerbates an already restrictive
international IPR protection regime, which leaves little flexibility for
public policy demands. Two examples will suffice to illustrate how TRIPS
exacerbates the restrictiveness of FDA regulation. First, TRIPS does not
allow departures or reservations from IPR protection except with the
Second,
consent of all countries that have signed onto it.'
notwithstanding the potential in TRIPS for balancing the interests of
producers and consumers of IPRs as discussed in Part III above, trade

discretion, and as such, "courts... may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using
the right asserted contrary to the public interest." Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
402, 492 (1942). A leading United States antitrust authority, the late Phlilip Areeda, opined that,
although what is contrary to the public interest is open-ended, "[ilt does seem clear ... that conduct
offensive to the antitrust laws is a misuse." PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXr, CASEs 183 (4th ed. 1988).
196. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 72.
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agreements have197been construed so narrowly as to rule out those public

policy concerns.

The FDA's high standards of drug approval, exacerbated by TRIPS, act
as a barrier for entry of new competitors into the pharmaceutical industry,
leading to the cartelization of the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, according
to the United Nations Development Program, 35% of the $297 billion
industry in 1998 was controlled by the top ten pharmaceutical
companies. 9 ' In 1999, the median return on equity for the twelve
pharmaceuticals members ofthe Fortune 500 was 35.8%, which was more
than double the median return of 15.2% for the Fortune 500 as a whole. 9
These returns were net, taking into account the sector's large research
expenses." ° The pharmaceutical industry also ranked first in return on
assets as well as return on revenues.2 ° '
Cartelization in the pharmaceutical industry has at least three
consequences, all at which are detrimental to the access and affordability
of AIDS drugs. First, it impedes competition in the international
pharmaceutical industry by deterring new entrants into the industry.
Second, it is directly related to the high cost of AIDS drugs, which have
become unaffordable for terminally-ill, low-end consumers. Third, it limits
expeditious access to AIDS drugs.
The United States Government's anti-competitive action, to wit its
participation in the cartelization ofthe pharmaceutical industry through its
statutory regime of drug approval, is arguably contrary to a general
principle of international law that favors free competition. While the
imprimatur of a government shields it from antitrust liability, particularly
in the intellectual property realm, the anti-competitive effect of
governmental action in cartelizing the pharmaceutical industry violates
antitrust law.
A- FDA Regulation:Pre-marketingTesting andApproval
The FDA's regulatory framework is the cumulative result of legislative
responses to drug-related tragedies such as the thalidomide scare of the
1950s.202 The stricter regulation of drug approval that has come about as
a result of drug scares in part reflects how perverse notions of risk inform
policy. While tightening drug approval is critical for public confidence in

197. See supranotes 64-90 and accompanying text.
198. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEvELOPMENT REPORT 67

(1999).
199. How the Industries Stack Up, FORTUNE, Apr. 2000, at F27.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
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available drugs on the market," 3 no regulatory regime could entirely
eliminate all risk given the uncertainties of scientific evidence. This being
the case, any regulatory regime will involve a choice as to the level of risk
that can be adopted. However, in view of the FDA's responsiveness to at
times irrational public perceptions of risk, its regulatory environment is
tilted towards eliminating risk at the expense of other legitimate public
policy goals. Such goals include expeditious access to affordable drugs for
terminally ill patients. In addition, given that there is bound to be
imperfect competition in any industry, including the pharmaceutical
industry, the choice of a regulatory framework is one between imperfect
regulation (insofar as it is impossible to eliminate all risk) and imperfect
competition.
The FDA's authority to approve drugs for safety and effectiveness falls
into four stages: Pre-clinical testing; Investigational New Drug (IND)
Testing; New Drug Application (NDA) Testing; and Post-Market
Surveillance. The following is a brief discussion of each.
1. Pre-Clinical Testing
The purpose of this stage is to determine whether a drug is sufficiently
safe and promising to justify human clinical testing. To make this
determination, the drug sponsor must engage in pre-clinical testing. The
drug sponsor must then file an Investigational New Drug Application
(IND) with the FDA.2 4 The IND application must contain all of the active
ingredients of the drug to be tested, a summary of any previous human
experience with the drug, a description of the overall investigation plan,
identification of phases of clinical investigation, a list ofpossible risks and
side effects, a protocol for each study to be conducted, and a summary of
pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug on animals.2" 5 It is
estimated that pre-clinical testing takes about thirty months.
2. Investigational New Drug (IND) Testing
If the FDA does not object to IND Testing, the applicant then proceeds
to clinical testing on human subjects. This stage comes in three phases.
Although these phases are not required under the law, the FDA recognizes
them as part of the process for establishing the safety and effectiveness of
drugs." Phase I, which lasts approximately six months, involves testing

203.. There is also the possibility that product liability law also acts as a background against
which the FDA's regulatory environment has grown. In other words, a tough regulatory
environment serves as a form of insurance against product liability for the pharmaceutical industry.
204. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a) (2001).
205. Id. § 312.23.
206. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
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the drug's safety on about twenty to eighty volunteers. The subjects are
tested for the safe dosage level of the drug, tolerance to the drug, how the
drug is administered, and how the drug is eliminated from the body. Phase
II, which involves several hundred subjects, tests the drug's safety and
effectiveness and could last up to eighteen months. Phase III takes place
only in cases where there is reasonable evidence about the drug's safety
and effectiveness. In this phase, the drug applicant has to administer the
drug under circumstances in which a physician would prescribe the drug.
The aim is to further the assessment of the safety and effectiveness of the
dosage and its effectiveness in treatment. A drug under consideration takes
three years to pass Phase III. The FDA has authority to terminate clinical
testing at any phase if it believes that the drug is unsafe and ineffective.20 7
3. NDA Testing and Post-Market Surveillance
Where an applicant can show the FDA promising results through Phase
III, it may submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for approval
to market the drug. This stage, which involves hundreds to several
thousand patients, takes an average of five years. The FDA may also
condition its NDA approval upon the submission of post-marketing
approval studies."' The post-marketing approval study stage is also known
as Phase IV. Only manufacturers, rather than physicians, are required to
report suspected adverse drug reactions. While post-marketing surveillance
is not a statutory requirement, it is now customary for the FDA to require
it with a view towards monitoring a drug's ongoing safety and efficacy.
FDA approval requires substantial evidence of a drug's safety and
effectiveness, 2as
established through adequate and well-controlled
9
0
investigations.
4. Terminally-Ill and AIDS Related Exceptions to FDA Regulation
There are several ways in which terminally-ill AIDS patients benefit
from shortened processes of FDA pre-market testing. In 1987, for
example, the FDA began the Treatment Investigational New Drug program
(Treatment IND), which allows physicians to prescribe unapproved
experimental drugs to terminally ill patients. The FDA stipulates that
physicians may prescribe unapproved, experimental drugs only when no

Procedures forDrugs Intended to TreatLife-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Injuries, 53 Fed.
Reg. 41,518 (Oct. 21, 1988).
207. 21 C.F.R. § 312.44 (2001).
208. Marion J. Finkel, Phase IV Testing: FDA Viewpoint and Expectations,33 FooD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 181, 183-84 (1978).
209. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2001).
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comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or therapy is available."' The
Treatment IND program is an example of the FDA's acknowledgment of
the need for speedy development of safe and effective drugs for
terminally-ill patients. However, the requirement that an illness be
"immediately life threatening" restricts the program's utility to individuals
suffering from HIV-related opportunistic diseases. 1
The Treatment IND program was expanded in the early 1990s to
improve expedited approval of AIDS drugs through a "parallel track"
mechanism. 2 12 This mechanism allows drug sponsors to conduct parallel
studies without the use of experimental controls, which ensure quality
controls. Expedited approval is facilitated through the provision of
experimental drugs to those enrolled in the parallel studies. Such
terminally-ill patients would not have had access to these drugs under
standard FDA pre-marketing approval trials, as only those enrolled in FDA
clinical trials have access to experimental drugs. In short, the "parallel
track" mechanism allows expanded availability of experimental drugs
through parallel studies conducted by the sponsor. However, only patients
for whom there is no alternative treatment available and who are ineligible
to participate in FDA trials can participate in expedited
access to
213
experimental drugs under the "parallel track" mechanism.
Another mechanism providing for an accelerated process of drug
approval is the "fast track" process. Since 1988, the FDA has reserved the
power to eliminate Phase II testing to facilitate a faster process of
establishing the safety and efficacy of a drug. Under this process, the FDA
evaluates requests for expedited approval after Phase II testing by
examining the risks and benefits of the drug, the severity of the disease,
and the availability of alternative remedies." Under the fast track process,
drugs that meet the FDAs safety and effectiveness criteria can be approved
without Phase III testing. 211 The fast track process is an incentive for
terminally-ill patients not to participate in risky, underground, unapproved,
and uncontrolled studies. Under this process, an applicant can apply for
FDA approval to conduct clinical trials without the use ofplacebo control

210. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(bXiii) (2001).
211. See Lisa Terrizzi, The Needfor ImprovedAccess to ExperimentalDrug Therapy: AIDS
Activists and Their Callfora ParallelTrack Policy, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 609-10 (1991).

212. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People with AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13,258
(Apr. 15, 1992).
213. Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Access to InvestigationalDrugsforTreatmentPurposes,50

AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 845, 845 (1994).
214. 21 C.F.L § 312.84 (2001).
215. Id. § 312.80.
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groups if
alternative effective therapies can be used for comparison and
21 6
control.
Another exception, which has been in force since 1989, for the use of
drugs that have not received FDA approval is the Personal Use Exception
Program. Under this program, unapproved drugs that are for the treatment
of threatening or serious conditions and that do not pose a significant
health risk may be brought into the United States by an individual or
through the mails. Although the Personal Use Exception Program was
initially intended for AIDS and cancer patients, it now covers a variety of
drugs.217 This program, which is the result of AIDS activism, has been
criticized as being only available to patients who can afford to import
unapproved drugs. In addition, the availability ofthis option has been cited
as a disincentive for terminally-ill patients to participate in FDA-approved
clinical trials, which could affect the accuracy of FDA drug safety and
effectiveness information.1 s
Another controversial avenue through which the FDA allows early
approval of new drugs for the treatment of serious or life-threatening
diseases, such as AIDS and Alzheimer's disease, is the application of
surrogate markers. A surrogate marker is defined by the FDA as a
"laboratory measurement or physical sign that is used in therapeutic trials
as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that is a direct measure
ofhow a patient feels, functions, or survives and that is expected to predict
the effect of therapy."' 19 Surrogate markers therefore measure a drug's
safety and effectiveness indirectly, unlike standard FDA procedures.
However, the FDA's approval in such instances is conditional. First,
the FDA requires post-marketing clinical studies of drugs approved based
on surrogate markers,' and, second, a failure to conduct such studies with
due diligence or a failure to verify clinical benefit will result in the FDA's
withdrawal of approval. " ! The controversy surrounding surrogate markers
reflects a primary theme of this article: while surrogate markers are
intended to expedite drug approval by short-circuiting costly and timeconsuming clinical trials, it is arguable that they could result in
compromising a drug's safety and efficacy.' Ultimately, the question is
216. Id. § 312.83.
217. Audrey A. Hale, Note, The FDAs Mail ImportPolicy: A QuestionableResponse to the
AIDS Epidemic, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 169, 169-70, 180 (1990).
218. See, e.g., Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration's Experimental Drug
ApprovalSystem: Is It GoodFor Your Health?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 309,309-10 (1991).
219. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, Accelerated Approval,
57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,235 (Apr. 15, 1992).
220. Id. at 13,235.
221. Accelerated Approval of New Drugs for Serious and Life-Threatening Illnesses, 21

C.F.R. § 314.530 (2001).
222. Marsha F. Goldsmith, HIVAIDS Early Treatment Controversy Cues New Advice But
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not whether all risk can be eliminated,' but what types of risks
terminally-ill patients are willing to accept in return for access to
affordable drugs. This also raises the question of paternalism.?' Does the
government's regulatory framework for drug approval compromise the
rights of terminally-ill patients to decide what products to use and
therefore what risks to assume?
One of the most significant initiatives enacted by the FDA in response
to critics, who stated that pre-market testing procedures resulted in lengthy
approval times, is charging pharmaceutical companies a user fee when it
reviews their NDAs." 5 With this money, the FDA was able to hire more
drug reviewers and to shore up its resources with a view towards
expediting the drug approval process. The alliance of pharmaceutical
companies and AIDS activists hoped that user fees would substantially
reduce the time within which drugs were approved. 6
B. The FDA's Regulatory Frameworkas a Barrierto Entry,
Access, andAffordability
Although the FDA's regulatory framework provides for a number of
exceptions, which provide for expeditious approval of AIDS drugs, the
rigorous requirements described above nevertheless act as barriers for new
entrants into the pharmaceutical industry. The following are some of the
most important issues in terms of ease of entry into the pharmaceutical
industry.
1. Lengthy Approval Times
The foregoing process of drug approval takes at least seven years. In
particular, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 19 62 ' imposed a variety
of clinical tests to establish drug safety and effectiveness. These
amendments came immediately after the Thalidomide scare, when the
FDA repeatedly declined to approve a sedative given to pregnant women

QuestionsRemain, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 295,296 (1993); Step By Step, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26,

1994, at 93-94.
223. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failureand Regulatory FailureAs Catalystsfor
PoliticalChange: The Choice BetweenImperfectRegulationandImperfectCompetition,46 WASH.

&LEEL. REV. 1, 23 (1989).
3 13

224. Marion Smiley, LegalizingLaetrile,in ETHICS ANDPOLMCS CASES AND COMMEN3 10,

(Amy Gutman & Dennis Thompson eds., 1997).
225. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571,
4491 (1992).

§ 101, 106 Stat. 4491,

226. Jon Hamilton, Uncloggingthe DrugPipeline:What the New FDA PolicyMeans to You,

8 AM. HEALTH: FITNESS OF BODY & MIND 78, 78 (1993).
227. DrugAmendments of 1962, Pub. L.No.87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended
at21 U.S.C. § 301-81 (2001)).
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2
because of a lack of sufficient evidence of its safety and effectiveness. 8
In Europe at the same time, Thalidomide was blamed for the incidence of
phocomelia, a condition causing babies to be born with deformities and
missing limbs. 9 Although the drug did not receive FDA approval, its
American sponsor had distributed it to over 1200 doctors for experimental
testing.? 0 A small outbreak of phocomelia occurred, leading to the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments, which tightened and thereby lengthened the
FDA's drug approval process."' The various initiatives such as the
Treatment IND program that allow accelerated approval of drugs for
patients suffering from life-threatening diseases, validate the idea that
lengthy approval times are a problem.

2. Elimination of Risks in a Risk Averse Society as a Driving Force of
FDA Regulation
The legislative response to the Thalidomide scare illustrates how the
public perception of risk can shape FDA policy. Besides the thalidomide
scare, other public responses to drugs have shaped the FDA's authority.
Indeed, the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was in a large part a victory of the
progressive movement's concern about widespread food and drug
impurities. 2 The inadequacy of the 1906 law did not receive legislative
attention until 1937, when a drug-related tragedy propelled reform. In this
instance, it was Elixer Sulfanilamide, a drug approved for use in the
United States in pill form. In its liquid form, however, the solvent had not
been tested for toxicity, and it resulted in 107 deaths . 33 This spurred the
passage of the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which required safety
testing and government approval of new drugs prior to commercial
marketing." 4 The next major legislative changes were in response to the
thalidomide scare. 5
It seems credible to argue that designing regulatory structures, such as
that of the FDA, with a view towards achieving a risk-free society would
adversely affect the allocation of resources for other purposes, such as

228. PETRTEI , TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION INTHE UNITED STATES 12324(1980).
229. Id. at 123.
230. Id.

231. Id at 124.
232. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906)
(repealed 1938).
233. David F. Cavers, Fooa4 Drugand Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative HistoryandIts
Substantive Provisions,6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2,20 (1939).
234. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at21 U.S.C. § 301-95 (2001)).
235. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
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providing health care. Indeed, some studies illustrate a mismatch between
regulatory costs and risk reduction.3 6 Yet, the FDA's mandate for health
and safety regulation has arisen largely in response to public health scares.
The public hence reacts more emphatically and dramatically to risks
related to food supply and drugs than to incremental risks, such as those
related to coal. The thalidomide scare is a good example of such perverse
responses to risk. Cass Sunstein, therefore, argues that justifying
government action by collective action in instances involving the
regulation of risk in food supply, and also drugs, might yield outcomes
such as regulatory regimes that proceed from a sort of innate human
inaccuracy of risk assessment 37 Similarly, Stephen Breyer notes that
Congress has a penchant for trying to solve social and economic problems
by passing laws and regulations based on moral conviction rather than
economic analysis." Hypothetically, one can therefore argue that, even
if the public were persuaded that free market forces and product liability
laws were sufficient to prevent the sale of unsafe food and drugs, the
public would still probably insist on government screening of new
products before they were sold.
3. Stringent Requirements for Acceptance of Foreign Data
The FDA accepts foreign clinical data as evidence of safety and
efficacy of drugs where the clinical studies were "well designed, well
conducted, performed by qualified investigators, and conducted in
accordance with ethical principles acceptable to the world community." 9
There are two categories under which foreign clinical data is accepted by
the FDA: foreign clinical studies that are not conducted under an IND, and
approval based on clinical data alone. Under the first category, data is
accepted as primary evidence of approval of a new drug provided that it
meets the specification noted above.' Under the second category, the data
must be applicable to the United States population and current medical
practice; it must be performed by qualified clinical investigators; and the
data can be considered valid without the need for on-site inspection, or if
the FDA considers such an inspection necessary, it can241validate the data
through on-site inspection or other appropriate means.

236. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 5 (1992).
237. CASS SUNSTEiN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVINo THE REGULATORY
STATE 53 (1990).
238. STEPHENBREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 3, 8, 378 (1982).

239. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a) (2001).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 314.106.
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While the conditions imposed on acceptance of foreign data in the
United States are primarily targeted at protecting the public from
dangerous and ineffective drugs, the European Union (EU) directives on
the sale and approval of medicinal products are aimed at protecting public
health while encouraging research and trade in the pharmaceutical
industry.242 The Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP)
has the authority within the EU to harmonize uniform and consistent data
acceptance policies between member states. The CPMP's guidelines have
facilitated inter-agency collaboration within the EU, thereby shortening the
process of drug approval. The FDA's stringent requirements, by contrast,
do not facilitate the easy exchange of clinical data. FDA requirements
therefore lead to wasteful duplication of resources, as drugs approved
abroad often have to go through the United States regulatory process. This
means that approval of drugs takes comparatively longer and the cost of
drugs is comparatively higher in the United States than in the European
Union.243

In 1991, the President's Council on Competitiveness proposed
measures to enhance United States recognition of foreign drug approvals.
For example, countries that have reciprocity agreements with the United
States can have their data automatically accepted. The Council has also
made efforts towards developing common research and drug approval
standards between countries.' Other proposals call for allowing the use
of animal test data from Japan and the EEC in FDA review processes 245
and joint review of drugs by the FDA and foreign counterpart agencies in
Japan, Australia and the EEC. 2"

4. High Costs Associated with the Lengthy Approval Process
The focus on protecting the public from risks related to unproven drugs
and the various departures from this regulatory regime, which increase the
time frame within which AIDS patients can get access to new drugs, are
costly to drug companies as well as to consumers. For example, Mark A.

242. See O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 22) 369 (1965), reprintedinCOMwSSiONOFTHEEUROPEAN
CoMMuNmEs, I THE RULES GOVERNING MEDICINAL PRODUCTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

23 (1989); John J. Gorski, An FDA-EEC Perspectiveon the InternationalAcceptanceofForeign
ClinicalData,21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 329,345-46 (1990-91).

243. Although Congress has enacted legislation to encourage international cooperation in
addressing the AIDS crisis, the FDA's requirements for drug approval have remained intact. This
new law also aims at promoting international research through institutions such as the World Health
Organization towards treatments and cures for AIDS. 22 U.S.C. § 6802 (2001).
244. Recommendationsto Speed DrugApprovalsIssued, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Food

Drug Cosmetic L. Rep. (CCH) 44,603, 43,617 (1991).
245. Id. at 42,806.
246. Id. at43,126.
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Kassel has argued that the FDA's refusal to expeditiously approve
effective drugs that are available in other countries has resulted in
mortality and morbidity costs that were avoidable. 47
Another cost passed on to the public, in addition to the FDA's goal of
maximum public safety, is product liability law."' For example, the Third
Restatement on Torts permits courts and juries to second-guess FDA
determinations on effective drug design. Hence, under the restatement, a
manufacturer could be held liable for prescription drugs and medical
devices whose risks outweighs their benefits, so that a health care provider
knowing these risks would not prescribe the product for any class of
patient.249 A 1991 American Law Institute report also concluded that everincreasing safety controls do not always enhance social welfare, because
the incremental, typically diminishing, benefits of greater stringency may
be swamped by mounting costs including the loss of useful products." In
addition, because the FDA has sole authority over the labeling of
prescription drug products, pharmaceutical companies are- exposed to
product liability suits in states in which the adequacy of a prescription drug
product's labeling is subject to jury resolution. The FDA justifies this
stringent control on the need to ensure that all labeling be supported by
reliable scientific evidence. 251
The use of prescription drug use fees is also regarded as potentially
imposing financial impediments to research and development in general,
as well as impeding market entry for new start-up biotechnology firms that
do not have the financial resources to meet this requirement. Such an
outcome is possible notwithstanding the fact that there are exceptions for
small business, as these exceptions limit,2but do not eliminate, only one of
three kinds of fees payable to the FDA.

247. Mark A. Kassel, Note, GettingThere With the Best: The NeedtoShorten the Prescription
DrugApproval Process,27 VAL. U. L. REV. 95, 99-102 (1992).
248. See Louis Lasagna, The ChillingEffect ofProductLiability on New DrugDevelopment,
in TEM LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPAcT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 336

(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient
PharmaceuticalLitigation:An EconomicRationaleforthe FDA RegulatoryComplianceDefense,

24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1452-55 (1994).
249. RESTATEMENT (THID) OF TORTS § 8 (tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
250. I AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITYFORPERSONALINJURY(1991).
251.

For example, in Woodersonv. OrthoPharmaceuticalCorp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan.

1984), a manufacturer of oral contracqtives, based on some adverse reports, had asked the FDA
to permit a labeling change to warn consumers about a serious reaction that could cause kidney

failure. The FDA refused to permit the change. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the FDA's
determination because the FDA's communication to the manufacturer could not determine that
consumers should not be warned that the drug could cause kidney failure. Id. at 1058.

252. See Danni Sabota,Biotech FirmsBraceforNew FDA UserFees,HoUs.Bus.J., Oct. 19,
1992, at 1.
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5. Comparing the FDA to the British Experience
To appreciate the FDA's authority in its mandate of pre-market testing
of drugs for safety and effectiveness, it is important to briefly compare and
contrast this mandate with those at the equivalent British agencies. The
main difference between the British and the American process of drug
approval is that, while in the American system safety and effectiveness are
required through pre-marketing studies, under the British system they are
required through post-marketing surveillance. Pre-marketing testing in the
British system therefore takes a much shorter time. 3
The agency for drug approval in Great Britain is the Medicines
Division of the Department of Health and Social Services. Drug approval
is pre-conditioned on a showing of safety, quality, and efficacy both before
and after approval. The pre-approval process requires animal testing, a
series of safety studies, as well as a six month period of chronic toxicity
study. 4 The Medicines Division issues Clinical Trial Certificates, which
authorize human use of drugs. A Clinical Trial Certificate expires after two
years unless it is renewed. A Product License allows for the marketing of
new drugs and is issued for five years unless it is reviewed. The licenses
impose a mandatory reporting system, which requires physicians to report
to the Committee on the Review of Medicine all adverse reactions to
drugs. This reporting system in turn lays the foundation for the Committee
on the Review of Medicines' mandate to take action to prevent similar
adverse reactions to a drug.5 For example, the Committee on the Review
of Medicines can advise the Medicines Division to issue warnings to the
public or to revoke the drug's marketing license.5 6
This is one of the main differences between British and United States
drug regulation, as the American system requires safety and effectiveness
to be shown prior to approval. This results in lengthy and costly premarketing clinical trials. By contrast, in the British system, a drug's
adverse effects, safety information, as well as safety and efficacy, are
demonstrated by post-market surveillance. 5 7
Critics argue that one of the downsides of the British system is that it
cannot reveal long-term adverse effects, which would require long-term,
FDA-type pre-market testing."5 Assuming that such FDA-type testing

253. See Rosemary Pierce Wall, InternationalTrends in New DrugApprovalRegulation:The
Impact on PharmaceuticalInnovation, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TEcH. L.J. 317,323-26 (1984)
[hereinafter Wall, InternationalTrends].
254. Julie C. Reliban, Note, Expediting FDA Approval to AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229,245 (1995).
255. See ia at 24547.
256. See generallyDAVID C. GREEN, MEDICINES INHE MARKETPLACE (1987).
257. See Wall, InternationalTrends, supranote 253, at 324-26.
258. See, e.g., id at 325.
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would reveal such long-term and perhaps serious reactions, the British
system postpones discovery of such reactions until the post-marketing
stage. The British system's relatively narrower threshold for drug
certification and licensing extends to its exceptions. Hence, for example,
there is an exception to certification ofnew drugs for therapeutic purposes
in cases of terminally-ill patients 59 However, under this exception, no
clinical testing
is required, unlike under the FDA's Treatment IND
26
program.
The British process of drug certification and licensing, unlike the
United States system, is not driven by the public's perceptions of risk as
a result of drug related tragedies. The British process is also insulated from
pharmaceutical industry and government pressures due to the use of
independent advisory committees. The advent of the AIDS crisis in Britain
has resulted in a balancing of governmental intrusion to address the health
crisis with the need to maintain the certification and licensing authorities'
autonomy.261
Overall, drug approval is cheaper and faster in Britain than in the
United States in at least three respects. First, the British experience gives
post-market surveillance a higher premium. Second, the British process
incorporates independent review committees. Third, it also provides for
accelerated access to new and experimental drugs to treat life-threatening
illnesses. As seen above, the FDA has taken steps to address this lengthy
and expensive approval process with a variety of exceptions. 262 These
measures have, however, not led to decreases in the importation of
unapproved drugs into the United States.263
C. A Summary of the Implicationsof the FDA "sRegulatory
Frameworkin the PharmaceuticalIndustryfor
Terminally-Ill, Low-End Consumers
The FDA's regulatory framework is "lengthy and bureaucratically rigid
relative to those ofother nations."2 " This is further exacerbated by product
liability law. The implications for consumers and pharmaceutical
companies include increased costs of manufacturing new drugs, higher
prices of drugs for consumers, and long waiting times for new drugs,

259. Reliban, supra note 254, at246.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See generally Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug
Introductionsin the UnitedStates andBritain,1977 Through 1987,46 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
& 1T'RAPEurics 121 (1989).
263. Steven P, Salbu, Regulation ofDrug Treatmentsfor HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian
Model ofAccess, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401,417 (1994).
264. Id. at 404.
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especially for terminally-ill patients. In the United States, these factors
have led to a thriving underground market ofunapproved drugs from other
countries, leading terminally-ill patients such as those with AIDS to
encounter unknown levels of risk exposure.
This state of affairs is not inevitable. Given the territorial manner in
which drug approval agencies work, it is not surprising that there are
vastly different regulatory fiameworks from country to country. However,
international cooperation to resolve the AIDS crisis through measures such
as the acceptance of foreign data that demonstrates safety and efficacy
could greatly reduce duplication of research initiatives.265 Although there
may be grounds for skepticism as to the validity of foreign data, the lack
of international cooperation to resolve the AIDS crisis is a reflection of
how jealously countries safeguard sovereign control of drug approval. 2"
1. FDA Cartelization is Contrary to Antitrust Law
In the United States, state or governmental action is immunized from
antitrust scrutiny. However, anti-competitive state or governmental action
is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. In the United States, there is a twopart test for determining whether otherwise uncompetitive conduct is
immune under the state action doctrine.267 Under this test, the challenged
restraint must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy" and 'actively supervised' by the State."26' The supervision
requirement prevents states from frustrating federal competition policy by
casting a "gauzy cloak of state269involvement over what is essentially a
private price fixing agreement.

265. Reliben, supranote 254, at 248.
266. See James O'Reilly, ThreeDimensionsofRegulatoryProblems:UnitedStates,European
Economic Community andNationalLaws, 41 FOOD & DRUG COSM. L.J. 131, 132 (1986).
267. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).

268. Id.(quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,410 (1978)); see
also S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1985). Another
exception to the immunity of state action against antitrust violations relates to instances in which
the state is acting as a commercial participant. However, it does not apply in this instance. See
Robert Wai, The CommercialActivity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of

ContemporaryInternationalLegalism, in TORTURE AS TORT: CoMAATIVE PERSPECTIVEs AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 213 (C. Scott ed., 2001).
269. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Dufly, 479 U.S. 335,345 (1987) (quoting Cal.Retail Dealers,445

U.S. at 106). It is also arguable that anticompetitive governmental conduct violates a general
principle of international law. Under Article 38(lXc) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are a source of international
law. Since international law is based upon consent of states, general principles of law found in a

majority of the national systems of states could very well be indicative of principles of public
international law. A general principal of international law need not be found in all states, but only
in most of them.
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With regard to the FDA, there may be a question as to whether a
legislative scheme that acts as a bar to entry may constitute state policy.2 70
However, courts in the United States are only interested in establishing
precedent if the regulatory scheme is a by-product of state action.
According to the Supreme Court:
Our decisions make clear that the purpose of the active
supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the State has
met some normative standard, such as efficiency, in its
regulatory practices. Its purpose is to determine whether the
State has exercised sufficient independent judgement and
control so that the details of the rates or prices have been
established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not
simply by agreement among private parties. 7
Hence, the only inquiry the Court makes in such a case is whether the
regulation is a by-product of state action. Yet, although courts have been
reluctant to interfere with state regulatory authority, there are instances in
which anti-competitive state action, in limiting entry to various trades or
callings, has been prohibited.2 n However, given that the FDA is a federal
regulatory body, it is not entirely clear the extent to which courts would
respond to claims that its mandate in establishing the safety and
effectiveness of drugs circumscribes the countervailing public interest in
free competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
Yet, there are a variety of reasons that the FDA's regulatory framework
will increase the susceptibility of the pharmaceutical industry to
cartelization. First, the patent regime creates a twenty-year monopoly in
the pharmaceutical industry. This monopoly places returns on investment
in research and development above competition as the best policy to serve
consumer welfare. Hence, although pharmaceuticals are very easy to reengineer, there is almost no gray market for pharmaceuticals, unlike
products enjoying copyright and trademark protection.
Subha Ghosh has argued that patent protection explains the lack of a
gray market in pharmaceuticals. Such gray markets, which allow
intrabrand competition, have resulted in lower consumer products prices
in products other than pharmaceuticals. In a sense, therefore, patent
protection, which is exacerbated by the FDA's mandate, results id the
cartelization of the pharmaceutical industry in a manner that raises drug
prices substantially. Drugs also take longer to get to consumers because of

270. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S. 34,43 (1985).
271. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992); see also New England Motor
Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1074 (1st Cir. 1990).
272. See, e.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,344-45 (1904).
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the lengthy drug approval times. Hence, only high-end consumers can
afford drug prices that result from the regulatory environment, which
raises pharmaceutical research and development costs substantially. 2'
It is now considered a truism that monopolists and oligopolists can
accommodate economic downturns better than small firms within an
industry: a benefit for consumers if this happens.27 4 However, while it is
also true that such market power gives these firms more flexibility in their
pricing policies so that they can recoup their research and development
costs, the inability of small firms to compete effectively with big firms
may act as a disincentive for further research and development. This is
especially the case where patents and other contract restrictions inhibit
smaller firms from entering an industry.2 75
Arguably, the patent monopoly thus raises the cost of drugs further, as
it reduces competition in the pharmaceutical industry. By contrast,
competition in the steel and automobile industries, which do not have
operation costs or barriers of entry as high as the pharmaceutical industry,
led to a lowering of prices. Competition in the pharmaceutical industry is
also circumscribed by the FDA's regulatory environment, which imposes
on new entrants and small firms in the industry the risk of enormous costs
that threaten their ability to survive with the market leadership of big
firms.
In essence, big firms have no incentive to produce for low-end markets
that cannot afford drugs sold in high-end markets. Unlike other industries,
like the automobile industry and the computer industry, which have grown
by and large by re-engineering and recombining ideas, new entrants in the
pharmaceutical industry face the costs of intellectual property
infringement, which keep drug prices high.
There is also a collective action problem. No firm would be willing,
without the cooperation of other firms, to lower the prices of their drugs
for low-end markets. However, in the recent past, individual firms have
made commitments to reduce drug prices for AIDS patients in Africa.
These announcements, however, came after the Pharmaceutical Industry
Initiative, which was agreed to under the auspices of UNAIDS in 2000,
failed to produce an industry-wide initiative. The incentives for individual

273. Shubba Ghosh, State CreationofGray Markets as a Limit on PatentRights, 53 FLA. L.
REv. 789 (2001).
274. SeegenerallyFREDWEsToN, CONCENATIONANDEFFICIENy:T'EOTHERSIDEOFTHE
MONOPOLY ISSUE (1978).
275. See Geoff Tansey, Trade Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: A Discussion
Paper 12 (1999), available at Quaker Peace e service website: http://hostings.diplomacy.edu
/quaker, cited in John H. Barton, The Impact ofPatentLaw on PlantBiotechnology Research, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS III GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: ACCESS AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS (Steve A. Eberhart et al. eds., 1998).
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companies to make their individual announcements of price cuts to
accommodate pressure on the industry are a reflection of a lack of more
thorough initiatives; this situation has come about as a result of the lack of
incentives to cooperate in finding a sustainable solution to the crisis.
A case could be made that pharmaceutical firms in situations ofupward
growth could sell their drugs at cost to low-end consumers without
undermining their efficiency or bottom-line. Indeed, recent research shows
that these companies expend a lot of money marketing their AIDS drugs
unnecessarily, as they have such a discrete market in which information
on available cocktails is very well-known especially in high-end markets.
Marketing costs rose following the FDA's 1997 relaxation of a rule that
prohibited direct-to-consumer advertising. In 1998, "America's
pharmaceuticals report[ed] spending $24 billion on research and
development but almost three times that amount, $68 billion, on
marketing, advertising and administration."2 6 These expenditures could
be misdirected, given that cocktails are very individualized in the sense
that they depend on an individuals' medical histories and other personal
attributes. In essence, the resources unnecessarily spent on advertising
AIDS drugs could be redirected towards either reduced prices of drugs for
low-end markets or other similar solutions, such as increasing drug
production to lower prices. Given that a primary purpose of antitrust law
today is to maximize consumer welfare in terms of lower prices, the issue
of inefficient competition between small firms does not arise in a period
of upward growth in the pharmaceutical industry. It is clear that
competition in the pharmaceutical industry between the upwardly-mobile,
big pharmaceutical companies and small competitors will help bring prices
down, as the example of Cipla, the Indian company, demonstrates.2'
Needless to say, spending on AIDS drugs has expanded enormously by
1146%, from $129.2 million in 1993 to $1.48 billion in 1998.7 It could
be argued that having so benefited from the AIDS pandemic, the
pharmaceutical industry is morally indebted to AIDS patients around the
world. 279
VI. CONCLUSION

There is a built-in tension regarding the place of social issues in
international economic governance. This built-in problem dichotomizes
private from public consequences in international economic governance.

276.
277.
278.
279.

Daniel Zingale, Silenc-$, at http://www.thebody.com/aacjul2099.htm (July 20,1999).
See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
Zingale, supra note 276.
See generally MICHAEL SANTORO, PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: GLOBAL CAPrrALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (2000).
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Public consequences, such as providing access to affordable AIDS
medicines, human rights and environmental protection, are presumed to be
controversial and problematic within the WTO's mandate of lowering
barriers to trade. The pursuit of freer trade, by contrast, is regarded as less
controversial because it de-politicizes international commerce by
eliminating sovereign controls over it.
In this Article, I have advocated two strategies of provisioning AIDS
drugs to low-end consumers. The first of these strategies exploits the
tension inherent in the WTO's mandate with regard to the place of social
issues alongside its mandate to lower barriers to trade. I exploit this
tension by examining exceptions to the exclusivity of patent protection,
such as through Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, as well as the possibilities for
compulsory and parallel licensing embedded in TRIPS. In addition,
developing countries have discretion in implementing TRIPS to set very
high standards for patentability, thereby legally excluding from patent
protection products or processes that would be inconsistent with a
country's legal standards.
Second, I advocate a competition-based critique of the operation of the
pharmaceutical industry as one of the reasons for the lack of expeditious
access to affordable AIDS drugs for low-end consumers. That is, the FDA
has placed a high premium on safety and effectiveness of AIDS drugs
without taking into account their access and affordability, especially to
low-end consumers. I have argued that changes at the FDA, such as
acceptance of foreign data to prove safety and efficacy of drugs approved
in countries with which the United States has reciprocity treaties, could
increase access to affordable drugs. In addition, it is plausible to argue that
increased competition in the pharmaceutical industry, which might result
in adopting a hybrid framework between the present framework and the
British experience, would have a desirable outcome for low-end
consumers facing life-threatening diseases.
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